China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age
This careful study is narrower than it initially seems because, in keeping with Cold War usage, "strategic" means nuclear. A richly documented study of China's acquisition of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines, a program that dates back to the 1950s. The authors conclude that the history of China's military industry explains why China could shed the legacy of past political upheavals and move into the modern age, a point specialists will ponder and perhaps dispute. Whether or not they are right, the authors tell an absorbing and convincing tale of how this technologically backward and politically turbulent country managed to create workable advanced weapon systems. As such, despite its narrow focus, the book has broad significance.
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Since independence, India's nuclear policy has been to seek either global disarm ament or equal security for all. The old nonproliferation regime was discriminatory, ratifying the possession of nuclear weapons for the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council while preaching to the nuclear have-nots about the virtues of disarmament. India was left sandwiched between two nuclear weapons powers, Pakistan and a rising China. The end of the Cold War has not ushered in an era where globalization and trade trump old-fashioned security woes. If nuclear deterrence works in the West, why won't it work in India?
Washington is leaving a crucial piece out of the nuclear puzzle. It will be China, not Russia or any rogue, whose nuclear policy will concern America most in the years ahead. The People's Republic has started to modernize its arsenal, and Western actions will help determine just what form China's force ultimately takes. Before rushing to deploy missile defenses, Washington should consider whether they would solve a problem or create one.
In one sense Russia and China pose the same problems. An international order of trade and cooperation has been established, and the two countries are in the process of joining. But their central governments are weak -- Russia's military is quasi-independent of Moscow, China's factories do not heed Beijing. Humiliation over national decline prompts symbolic defiance of the United States. Ukraine and Taiwan remain dangerous flash points that call for tacit deterrence. Like adolescents, Russia and China are in a transitional stage requiring patience and guidance rather than confrontation.

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