More Precious Than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World
A veteran of the Washington policy wars has written a tour de force on the U.S.-Soviet struggle for the Third World. At turns dispassionate, witty, and argumentative, Rodman brings to the work not only a near-unique vantage point as a senior aide in four Republican administrations but also highly impressive skills as a historian. Beginning with the clash between Wilson and Lenin over the colonial question, Rodman expertly traces the unfolding of the great game over the following 75 years, with most of the work given over to the 1970s and 1980s and to detailed treatments of the crises in Angola, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Central America. Rodman shows how, at the moment of abject American demoralization following the collapse in Vietnam, the Soviet Union began to break out of the fetters that Nixon and Kissinger had attempted to impose. Its various interventions, culminating in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, underlined the necessity for vigorous American opposition. They also provided an opportunity to pay the Soviets back in their own coin, and American support was funneled to armed insurgents who contributed significantly to the enfeeblement and collapse of Leninism. Ironically, this resistance was most effective in Afghanistan, where it was least democratic. Nevertheless, in Rodman's view Reagan's great accomplishment was that he joined together a strategic rationale and a moral justification ("the democratic revolution") for U.S. actions, tapping "the Wilsonian tradition as a motivation for the accomplishment of a Nixonian strategic purpose."
Whatever its merit in the past, the relevance of the Reagan formula for the post-Cold War world is questionable. The partners to the union, Mr. Strategic Purpose and Ms. Moral Vision, seem increasingly ill at ease in one another's company. It seems most unlikely that the form their dalliance took under the Reagan Doctrine -- underwriting armed insurrections on behalf of free government -- provides a justifiable policy for a future without the Soviet threat.
Related
American presidents have usually inherited poor relations with the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, of course, was confronted by the tensions of Korea and President Kennedy by the Berlin crisis. Lyndon Johnson was a temporary exception, but Richard Nixon inherited Vietnam and the Czech crisis. Gerald Ford had to deal with a faltering détente, and Jimmy Carter was embroiled in early disputes. In January 1981, Ronald Reagan found himself in much the same position as his predecessors, except that relations were worse than usual. Indeed, relations were frozen. Even the outgoing Administration was pessimistic. The departing American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Thomas J. Watson, Jr., summed up the prevailing gloom: "I don't think the West has any conception of how dismal the future looks for East-West relations."
Reprints extracts of an article first published in the Apr 1951 issue of FA, after the Korean invasion had intensified the Cold War, which prophetically described the possible characteristics of a post-Soviet Russia, of which US foreign policy-makers ought to be cognizant. The reprint does not make clear where the 'cuts' have been made.
The next president will have to reassess the U.S.-Russian relationship and find the right balance between pushing back and cooperating.

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