Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Security
A broad-gauged survey of Europe's post-1989 trouble spots. Also a detailed, critical, and prescriptive analysis of the institutions that could or should provide peacekeeping machinery, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO, and the Western European Union. A recurrent theme emphasizes the potential threat of a resurgent Russia (with its 30,000 nuclear warheads), especially in the face of a likely decline of the American presence in Europe. Dean also notes new departures in German policies and concludes that "the united Germany has in the NATO-WEU context become a second France." Dean, a long-time participant in arms control deliberations and negotiations, presents a valuable combination of instant history and acute analysis of European security questions, seeing Europe as a potential model for peacekeeping in other regions of the world. A major work, despite the occasional slips in historical account.
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The NATO war in Kosovo did not come out of the blue. The alliance fought only after Belgrade turned a deaf ear to diplomacy, and NATO knew the risks it was running. But doing nothing would have been worse; assenting to Slobodan Milosevic's mass killings would have dangerously undermined the credibility of Western institutions.
