Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France Since 1940
An analysis of Franco-American relations from Franklin Roosevelt's snubbing of Charles de Gaulle to present disputes of two countries in decline. Major crises -- the dispute over the European Defense Community and the Eurocorps, for example -- are case studies. The value of the book is Cogan's understanding of the fundamental cultural and historical differences that inevitably intrude into and chafe relations between the two countries. An odd mixture of history and journalism, a revised doctoral dissertation, enlivened by the author's 37 years in the CIA.
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Both the United States and France benefited from the geopolitical freeze during the Cold War. Now that the bipolar stalemate is over, Germany is preoccupied with reunification, England is economically hobbled and blanches at the European Community, and migration of the rising populations of North Africa and the Middle East may soon threaten more disruption than post-Soviet states. France alone among its neighbors has the desire, ambition and means to lead the reordering of Europe's security. Yet its efforts must fuse with U.S. policy, not snuff it out.
President Charles de Gaulle in discussing current Franco-American relations often focuses upon the prewar neutrality of the United States as well as upon his wartime differences with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In doing so he conjures up the image of an unreliable American ally. His recollections have also pushed into the background of public memory the two years before France's tragic collapse in June 1940, when, in the words of former Premier Edouard Daladier, "President Roosevelt was for France a very great and noble friend." As Premier during those years, Daladier witnessed at first hand the American President's efforts to help France order some 4,000 American combat planes to rebuild French defenses against the imminent attack of Hitler's vastly superior air power. Hitherto the details of the story have been wrapped in the secrecy of American and French archives, private papers and personal memories, but it can now be seen that Roosevelt concentrated his principal effort on that aid because he believed that in no other way could the United States strengthen France so significantly. Neither Morgenthau's monetary agreements nor the sale of machine tools and raw materials would do so much to increase French capacity to resist Nazi aggression. Roosevelt was ready to go as far as possible in spite of isolationist opposition to the delivery of planes to France because of his further conviction that, despite the Neutrality Act, the frontiers of the United States extended to the Rhine.
How can the United States and Europe mend the Western alliance after the split over Iraq? Some Europeans now favor engaging America head on, by building an independent military. But the best answer lies in complementarity, not competition. The two sides should focus on common goals, with each doing what it does best.

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