Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956
The story is enthralling; its telling, unobtrusive and efficient; but most of all, the research on which it rests is enormously careful and complete. Had the Soviet Union continued to be the United States' nuclear adversary, this book would have lighted the recesses of layered myths and assumptions concerning the Soviet stake in nuclear weapons. Not that it vindicates the idea that America, who was first with the bomb, could have put it under international lock and key and avoided the nuclear arms race. Holloway's discoveries make it plain that Stalin's suspicions could not have been softened nor his quest for the weapon discouraged. But they make it no less plain that Lavrenty Beria, who played a key role in organizing the Soviet effort, and the military had no diabolical sense of how this horrifying new technology could be turned to their advantage. On the contrary, Soviet leaders were slow to recognize the significance of U.S. wartime progress toward an atomic bomb, despite the up-to-date detail their intelligence services provided. Even in 1953 and 1954, when they moved virtually at the same time as the United States from the atomic to the thermonuclear era, their thinking and plans remained inchoate, confused, and presumably malleable to the choices of the other side.
With the rivalry over, at least for the moment, a measure of its long, powerful hold is that Holloway's account is so utterly engrossing. To be able at last to glimpse the people at work behind the shroud, including a remarkable cast of nuclear scientists, the fumbling efforts of Stalin and his colleagues to turn their vast political machine to the task, and the early attempts by the Soviet military to think their way through the meaning of this new weapon makes this a hard book to put down. As for spies and the degree to which those who betrayed the United States aided the Soviets, only one seems to have been important: the British atomic scientist, Klaus Fuchs. His contribution to the Soviet atomic bomb, however, was large and direct. The hydrogen bomb the Soviets developed on their own.
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"Gorbachev's new thinking does not indicate that the Soviet Union wishes to abandon its role as a world power, but it provides a different picture of the world and redefines the Soviet role in it". Discusses (1) the failure of Brezhnev's foreign policy (2) Gorbachev's redefinition of Soviet thinking on international relations (3) new principles of defensive sufficiency (4) effects on arms control (5) domestic motivations. Professor of political science, Harvard University.
Discusses (1) the size of Soviet military forces (nuclear, naval, air and ground) (2) the ideological drive behind Soviet defence policy (3) possible future doctrinal developments. Since the late 1970s, changing technology has stimulated doctrinal change, giving rise to concepts of multi-front operations. But the doctrinal vision is at the moment unrealisable, and the Soviets may thus be seeking to reduce nuclear arsenals, so as to make defence of the rear easier in wartime. Concludes that, in the light of the continuing ideological basis of Soviet doctrine, the West must be careful not to underestimate the danger which lies behind the undermining of deterrence through badly-conceived arms control measures. Director, National Security Agency, 1985-88. Very useful analysis, recommended.
The Chechnya misadventure unmasked what Russia's armed forces have known for awhile: the heir to the once-vaunted Soviet military is in shambles. Years of cutbacks in Russia's military budgets, worsened by rapid inflation, have crippled morale, the development of new weapons, maintenance, and training. At the upper echelons, there is now an exodus of talented and experienced officers; in the lower ranks, desertion and draft evasion are widespread. Nevertheless, the Russian military has largely remained above politics and helped to stabilize the nation amid reform. The United States would do well to press for an honest and open military-to-military relationship with Russia. One day, a grave nuclear threat may require it.

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