With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush and Saddam, 1982-1990
After a spate of instant histories on the Persian Gulf War, a carefully researched analytical book has finally appeared. Now one can review both what happened and why, although not all will agree with the tough criticism of the failures of the Reagan and Bush administrations. The author takes issue with tactical alliances with rogue states -- "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" -- and warns that the United States should have been much more cautious in its cooperation with Saddam during the 1980s and much more intent on continuing to deter Iraqi power after the Iran-Iraq War was over in 1988. He shows convincingly that Saddam gave ample warning of his aggressive moves against Kuwait, and the United States simply failed to note them. He does not, however, stress enough that the anti-Syrian dimension of U.S. policy in the 1980s led some to conclude that Saddam could be a useful ally against Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad, not just Iran. Even some Israelis and their supporters adopted this view, and Saddam's hints of moderation on peace with Israel gained him more credit in official circles in Jerusalem and Washington than he deserved. Still, Jentleson misses few of the markers along the road to the invasion and provides a tough but fair assessment of the misconceptions and mistakes that marred American policy. It will be interesting to note if Jentleson, now a member of the Policy Planning Staff at State, is able to put his conclusions to good use. Perhaps his next book will tell.
Related
How Many Casualties Will Americans Tolerate?
Misdiagnosis
CHRISTOPHER GELPI
In "The Iraq Syndrome" (November/December 2005), John Mueller argues that public support for the American wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq can be explained with "a simple association: as casualties mount, support decreases." He goes on to say that support for the Iraq war has dropped so fast that it makes sense to talk about an "Iraq syndrome," a casualty-induced aversion to the future use of force by the United States.
Public support for the war in Iraq has followed the same course as it did for the wars in Korea and Vietnam: broad enthusiasm at the outset with erosion of support as casualties mount. The experience of those past wars suggests that there is nothing President Bush can do to reverse this deterioration -- or to stave off an "Iraq syndrome" that could inhibit U.S. foreign policy for decades to come.
Andrew Krepinevich ("How to Win in Iraq," September/October 2005) proposes Baghdad and Mosul as the two primary targets for "oil-spot offensives." He asserts that the focus should be on "protecting the population, not pursuing insurgent forces." This proposal ignores two basic realities. first, Baghdad and Mosul are sprawling cities. Their populations would be very difficult to protect without pulling troops, American or Iraqi, from more contentious parts of Iraq.

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