Somalia: The Missed Opportunities
The 1992 U.N. intervention in Somalia was not the organization's finest hour, and the lessons of its failure should be heeded. Mohamed Sahnoun, the veteran Algerian diplomat who served as U.N. special representative to Somalia until his controversial resignation six weeks before the landing of U.S. troops in December 1992, contends that between the outbreak of civil war in 1988 and the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in January 1991, the United Nations missed at least three opportunities to prevent large-scale loss of life. Once the United Nations began efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, its performance was far surpassed by nongovernmental organizations, whose competence and dedication highlighted the United Nations' bureaucratic inefficiencies and excessive caution. Unless sweeping reforms are made, Sahnoun argues, the United Nations will continue to respond with inept improvisation.
Related
The mistakes of the U.S. intervention in Somalia should not obscure its successes: a humanitarian tragedy was averted, and the political landscape was improved.
Two new books recognize that the United Nations cannot handle the burdens recently thrust upon it, but only one sees the need to set more realistic goals.
"The drama of military intervention and the media's fixation on looters and 'warlords' now threaten to obscure the fact that, prior to late 1992, the international response to Somalia's long agony was indeed abject failure." Bungled, halfhearted efforts by U.N. diplomats, relief agencies and Security Council members contributed to the very circumstances of anarchy and violence that prompted the invasion by 21,000 U.S. Marines of the famine- and war-riven nation. International success in Somalia now depends on fashioning a more forceful U.N. presence and a lasting peace.
