Somalia: The Missed Opportunities
The 1992 U.N. intervention in Somalia was not the organization's finest hour, and the lessons of its failure should be heeded. Mohamed Sahnoun, the veteran Algerian diplomat who served as U.N. special representative to Somalia until his controversial resignation six weeks before the landing of U.S. troops in December 1992, contends that between the outbreak of civil war in 1988 and the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in January 1991, the United Nations missed at least three opportunities to prevent large-scale loss of life. Once the United Nations began efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, its performance was far surpassed by nongovernmental organizations, whose competence and dedication highlighted the United Nations' bureaucratic inefficiencies and excessive caution. Unless sweeping reforms are made, Sahnoun argues, the United Nations will continue to respond with inept improvisation.
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The intervention in Somalia was not an abject failure; an estimated 100,000 lives were saved. But its mismanagement should be an object lesson for peacekeepers in Bosnia and on other such missions. No large intervention, military or humanitarian, can remain neutral or assuredly brief in a strife-torn failed state. Nation-building, the rebuilding of a state's basic civil institutions, is required in fashioning a self-sustaining body politic out of anarchy. In the future, the United States, the United Nations, and other intervenors should be able to declare a state "bankrupt" and go in to restore civic order and foster reconciliation.

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