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On American Principles

By George F. Kennan
March/April 1995
Article Summary and Author Biography

Faced with demands for support from rebellious Spanish colonies in South America following the Napoleonic wars, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams enunciated a principle of American foreign policy that is still relevant today: the best way for a larger country to help smaller ones is by the power of example. To go further, Adams warned, would be "to involve America beyond the power of extrication in all the wars of interest and intrigue." Good advice, then as now.

George F. Kennan is Professor Emeritus in the School of Historical Studies at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J. This is his nineteenth article for Foreign Affairs. His first, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," appeared in July 1947 under the pseudonym, X. Copyright 1995 by George F. Kennan.

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