The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s
An authority on French history has written a brilliant survey of the key aspects of French life in the decade before the debacle. A pointillist approach, full of individual anecdotes, that gives a portrait of confusion and conflict, of cultural creativity and political dithering. The author's admirable erudition -- and the stunning command of sources, published and unpublished, ingeniously assembled -- is rendered in lighthearted, witty, but unfailingly perceptive commentary. Incisive judgments abound: "Catholicism was the Right at prayer," especially at the time of the Popular Front. A pithy summary of French ambivalence about America's growing presence: "Americans were young, rich, generous, physically seductive, mentally deficient, culturally detrimental." Weber writes with affection and stringent regret, and he does much to explain France's decline and defeat. He makes one ponder how in the postwar decades France regained resilience and in essential ways transformed itself.
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On the surface at least, the Gaullist régime in France now looks substantially stronger than before the May crisis. The June elections gave General de Gaulle and his then Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou, a massive parliamentary majority that for the next five years seemingly insures M. Pompidou's successor, former Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, against every normal political hazard-except, perhaps, the eventual loss of his master's confidence. What is probably even more important, the deep national consensus indicated by the scale and circumstances of the Gaullist electoral victory has clearly restored the General's momentarily shaken faith in his own thaumaturgic powers. If a new confrontation between the state and the revolutionary students and workers develops during the next few months, as it may, General de Gaulle can no doubt count this time on a prompt reawakening of the "national instinct" that responded so sluggishly to his leadership last spring. The loyalty of the police, which wavered for a few dangerous days in May after Pompidou's apparent surrender to the students, has been consolidated by appropriate administrative measures during the summer months; the loyalty of the army, which had to be won over at the crucial moment by the amnesty promised General Raoul Salan and other former rebels or conspirators against de Gaulle's Algerian policies, is thought to be fully dependable today. The split between the orthodox Communists and the revolutionaries of the New Left, which probably helped more than either General de Gaulle's charisma or General Massu's armored force-in-being to save the bourgeois republic in its hour of peril, seems to have become even more bitter and unbridgeable since the elections. There is no direct and overt threat to the General's authority from the Right. The personal rivalries and ideological tensions that unquestionably exist within the majority do not seem incoercible. The economic and financial problems that confront the Government are serious, but not, as far as one can judge, unmanageable.
Three years after having signed a treaty of coöperation with Dr. Adenauer, designed to make the marriage of France and Germany the foundation for the regrouping of Europe, General de Gaulle has travelled to the Soviet Union to talk of rediscovered friendship, agreement and even "alliance" between the "new France" and the "new Russia." Now the latter, pending information to the contrary, is the principal adversary of the German Federal Republic, and the Soviet leaders do not hide the fact that they look upon the rapprochement with Paris as a means of gaining support against German "revanchism." We may therefore be permitted to question the degree of coherence in the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic and to wonder whether such changes of course-there are other examples-cannot be best explained by psychological factors, the first of them being excessive amour propre.
In Germany as in France, 1969 will be remembered as the year of the break in continuity. The principal break is in each case obvious: the departure of General de Gaulle after eleven years in power and the relegation of the Christian Democrats to the opposition after twenty years in power. But the nature and import of these breaks call for interpretation.
