Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West
Rieff is twice different from other commentators on the Balkans. First, for him, the issue is settled; the disaster is complete; Bosnia is destroyed, with nothing to be saved. The ongoing struggle to control the carnage and find some basis for ending the war -- at a minimum to prevent its escalation or spread -- has no meaning for him when set alongside what the West has lost of its soul, the integrity of its most cherished values, and, not least, its capacity to act in still more fateful circumstances. Second, where other writers start from an analysis of the Bosnian tragedy, its causes, and the reasons for its course and only from the side smuggle in sentiment and indictment, Rieff's aim is different, and on that he is up front. He intends his book to be a skewering of Western governments and the U.N. agencies whose skirts they hid behind for letting the tragedy happen. Analysis and the recounting of what he saw serve simply as skewers.
So this is an angry, indignant writer, a journalist who frankly admits to the bias many have accused the Western press of having on the Bosnian war, freely lambasting U.S. administrations, European politicians, and even the U.N. Protection Force. Why then read the book? First, because his is one of the first serious attempts to deal systematically with the responsibility of those on the outside, including the United Nations, for what has happened, as opposed to the many other books assigning responsibility among those on the inside. Second because, with the potency of a very talented writer, he carries the reader beyond the wrenching facts of the war to the deep, twisted meaning they have come to have for the people there and, no less, for those of us far away. This last he does by asking as insistently as anyone could what it signifies to have permitted genocide to destroy a country. The great powers could have prevented it, he believes, though only at very great cost to themselves. What, is his ultimate question, are the implications for their future of refusing to pay great costs for great principles?
Related
In our nuclear age, questions of defense planning-once a fairly simple matter of estimating the amounts expended by the various nations, totting up numbers of mobilizable men, evaluating weapons (as in Janes Fighting Ships), appreciating the contributions of allies and so on-have passed into a surrealistic sphere of bluff, counterbluff, nightmare and potential extinction of the human race. Reassuringly, neither of the superpowers, even when one held a monopoly or a vast preponderance of nuclear power, has so far been willing to use, or to threaten the use of, the superweapon in pursuit of its political aims-even (as in Vietnam) against a tiny nonnuclear adversary. (Khrushchev's empty threat at the time of Suez was the exception that proves the rule.) Indeed, its possession has so far simply resulted in a perpetuation of the political status quo. Any negotiated arrangement between the superpowers on the limitation or even reduction of their nuclear panoply will also, most likely, only be possible on such a basis.
Charles Kupchan ("Independence for Kosovo," November/December 2005) is correct when he asserts that countries such as Russia have no real interest in Kosovo as a territory; Kosovo as a precedent, however, is another matter. Governments from Baku to Beijing and separatist regimes from Trans-Dniestria to the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus are taking a keen interest in how questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity are handled in the determination of Kosovo's final status.
Given the atrocities they have suffered in the past and the autonomy they are enjoying now, Kosovo's Albanians will never accept continued Serbian sovereignty. The time has come to give them what they want -- independence.
