To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison
Francis T. Seow recounts his experiences as a government official and dissenter under the autocratic government of Lee Kuan Yew. Since the mid-1970s, Lee's regime has cracked down on dissent, meting out harsh sentences for relatively minor offenses (as Michael Fay painfully discovered last year).
After several run-ins with the government, Seow was arrested in 1988 and imprisoned. His crimes: talking to an American diplomat about running for office and representing some alleged Marxists in court. Much of the book details abuse Seow suffered, including long interrogations, sleep deprivation, and being forced to stand naked in cold drafts. After 72 days, Seow was released. He now lives in exile in Boston.
Seow's story is compelling but one-sided. His understandably vitriolic account does not distinguish Singapore from similarly authoritarian countries with much less dramatic economic growth. Moreover, most government officials and many citizens believe that the use of draconian emergency powers, which date back to the communist insurgency of the 1950s, account for Singapore's success in combating crime. For these supporters, Confucian obedience is a small price to pay for economic and political stability.
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More than economics, more than politics, a nation's culture will determine its fate. So says the man who built Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew. Lee is not optimistic that other nations can replicate East Asia's staggering growth. He is critical of the social breakdown that he sees in America: "The expansion of the rights of the individual has come at the expense of orderly society." East Asia is changing in the face of rapid growth, but Lee doubts that American-style individualism will ever catch on there. While critical of American social order, Lee strongly supports America's role as a balancer in East Asia. If it withdraws, other powers, notably Japan, would go their own way. And that would unsettle the region's peace.
Flanking the sea artery connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and virtually linking the Asian mainland with the Indonesian archipelago, the island of Singapore occupies a strategic position in southeastern Asia. Toward its 220 square miles of territory have converged races from all the Orient, but especially the southern Chinese in their ubiquitous quest for commercial opportunities. When Sir Stamford Raffles established a trading post near the Singapore River on February 6, 1819, the island's only inhabitants were a few hundred Malays. Four months later, however, he wrote: "From the number of Chinese already settled, and the peculiar attraction of the place for that industrious race, it may be presumed that they will always form the largest part of the community." Today, some 75 percent of Singapore's million and three-quarters inhabitants are Chinese- the largest urban concentration anywhere of overseas Chinese.
AUSTRALIA'S decision to keep forces in Malaysia and Singapore after Britain leaves in 1971 was taken in an election year, after the most searching public debate on defense and foreign policy in Australia's history and after a substantial official review. It represents, therefore, one country's practical assessment of Southeast Asia "after Viet Nam." In this sense, the decision may have significance outside Australia, for the light it throws on the development of Australian thinking, for the contribution it is intended to make to the security of the immediate subregional neighborhood and for the assumptions it appears to make about the broader question of stability in Asia, especially the role of the United States.

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