The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong
The mistakes of the U.S. intervention in Somalia should not obscure its successes: a humanitarian tragedy was averted, and the political landscape was improved.
Chester A. Crocker is a research professor at Georgetown University and serves as Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1981 to 1989. This comment is adapted from his foreword to Somalia and Operation Restore Hope by John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1995.
Under the protection of a U.S. military umbrella, the United Nations extricated itself from Somalia in early March 1995. The exit went well and may serve as a model for pulling U.N. peacekeepers out of the former Yugoslavia and other places where they run into trouble. But what lessons is the United States drawing from the "failed" Somalia enterprise? Is "failure" the right term to describe the U.S. and U.N. military intervention? If so, what is it that failed?
Appraisals of the Somalia operation vary widely. Some disparage it as a media-driven spectacle of misguided internationalism that ignored the pitfalls of intervention in alien places lacking civil order and legitimate political institutions. Some see Somalia as an almost welcome inoculation against the temptation to intervene in places such as Rwanda, while others blame the Somalia operation for sapping U.S. political will and global standing and for inhibiting Americans from doing the right thing in "more important" places like Bosnia. The lesson, in this view, is to refrain from applying global standards and to disengage from the world's strategic slums. Another school views Somalia as an epitaph for multilateralism and an object lesson on the United Nations' inadequacies and the need to limit the U.S. role in U.N. peacekeeping. Still others view Somalia as a laudable step toward a new era in American exceptionalism and humanitarian leadership, which turned sour because the United States became entangled in local politics. The actual lessons, however, are more subtle and more interesting than these one-liners suggest.
THE STANDARD OF SUCCESS
The intervention in Somalia was not a failure as measured by the standards first set by President Bush. Much has been accomplished in humanitarian terms, and a larger tragedy has been averted. How large a tragedy it is impossible to know, but, judging by the Somali death toll of 1992, one could reasonably estimate that upwards of a quarter of a million Somali lives were saved. Some failure.
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The intervention in Somalia was not an abject failure; an estimated 100,000 lives were saved. But its mismanagement should be an object lesson for peacekeepers in Bosnia and on other such missions. No large intervention, military or humanitarian, can remain neutral or assuredly brief in a strife-torn failed state. Nation-building, the rebuilding of a state's basic civil institutions, is required in fashioning a self-sustaining body politic out of anarchy. In the future, the United States, the United Nations, and other intervenors should be able to declare a state "bankrupt" and go in to restore civic order and foster reconciliation.
The difference between the factions in Bosnia is not morality, as the Bosnian Muslims and Western press insist, but power and opportunity. All have the same goal: to avoid living as a minority. All have committed crimes against other ethnic groups. Despite its claims of neutrality and preaching against military solutions, the United States has favored the Bosnian Muslims, keeping silent as they launched offensives from U.N.-guarded safe areas. Since air strikes cannot resolve the conflict, the United States must discourage violence by all sides and let Russia--the one country Serbs trust--take the lead in negotiations.
The Bush administration set out to clear relief channels and avert mass starvation in Somalia, resisting a more ambitious U.N. agenda. But the Clinton administration embarked on "nation-building" and "assertive multilateralism." The resulting violence and embarrassment cast doubt on the United Nations' competence in peaceenforcement and "nation-building."

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