Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour
Israel and Egypt's cold peace has turned arctic. Jerusalem and Cairo are clashing over nuclear disarmament, other Arab states' ties to Israel, the stability of the Mubarak regime, and the peace process. The strains stem from Israel's and Egypt's competing visions of a new Middle East, which they both hope to lead. With U.S.-Egyptian relations also on the rocks, these tensions threaten the entire Middle East peace process.
Fawaz A. Gerges, who spent January in Egypt, is a Visiting Fellow at the Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, and a faculty member at Sarah Lawrence College. He is the author of The Superpowers and the Middle East:Regional and International Politics.
A COLD PEACE GETS ARCTIC
Far more threatening to the Middle East peace process than the increase in bloody attacks by Islamic militants against Israelis are the recent strains in Egyptian?Israeli relations. For the last five months, notwithstanding the diplomatic niceties of their regular meetings, the Egyptian and Israeli leaderships have clashed publicly over a wide range of issues that have brought the two countries to the brink of crisis. The verbal war reveals deep insecurity, suspicion, and hostility. This dramatic turn of events raises disturbing questions not only about the future direction of Egyptian?Israeli relations but also about the long?term viability of the peace process itself.
The main point of contention is the character and composition of the new Middle East order and the roles of Egypt and Israel in it. Their competing visions struggle to shape the region's dynamics in their own images. Israel hopes to construct a new regional order that is Middle Eastern instead of Arab, in which Israel would be the dominant economic power. Thus, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres recently called for expanding the Arab League's membership to include Israel and other non?Arab Middle Eastern states.
Since the signing of their peace accord with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993, the Israelis have pursued active economic diplomacy to lift the Arab economic boycott against Israel and establish links with various Arab states. Israel's campaign has led to important breakthroughs with Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and several Persian Gulf countries. The Arab boycott is being quietly and unceremoniously buried. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Peres, and other ministers, leading a large team of Israeli businessmen at a major economic conference last October in Casablanca, Morocco, impressed on their Arab counterparts the mutual benefits of economic collaboration, promising high financial returns and incentives. But Peres, according to the Egyptian press, went further, poking fun at Egypt's failing political and economic record: "Egypt led the Arabs for 40 years and brought them to the abyss; you will see the region's economic situation improve when Israel takes the reins of leadership in the Middle East."
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
The purpose of recent American diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East is simply stated. It is to stop the fighting and bring the peace effort back to the point, now nearly three years ago, when Ambassador Gunnar Jarring was setting out on his mission to help bring about an agreed Arab-Israeli settlement on the basis of a unanimous U.N. resolution. It is a measure of the deterioration since that time that these modest proposals, the results of which are uncertain as these lines are written, have generated optimism by their initial success in breaking the fixed pattern of reliance on force alone. For they came at a time of gloom over the prospects for settlement and of alarm over military events which could bring major Soviet gains or grave risk of war. Participation of Soviet pilots and missile crews in military operations had already limited Israel's mastery of the skies over Egypt and might in time shift the balance of power which now favors Israel. Once that balance is upset, President Nixon has said, the United States "will do what is necessary" to restore it.
The problem in the Arab-Israeli peace process in late 1985 is not how to arrange a negotiation. The problem is how to make it politically possible--even imperative--for leaders in the conflict to commit themselves to negotiate. Making peace is first a political process, and only second a negotiating process, as the experience of the 1970s taught us. The intense negotiations of that decade, from the shuttle diplomacy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger through the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, followed political steps that had already demonstrated commitment to negotiation and lowered the human and psychological barriers to peace.
The relative ease of the Gaza withdrawal has fooled many observers into thinking that the Palestinian Authority can now concentrate on consolidating its hold over the territory. Washington and its allies are pushing hard for the PA to do so. But everyone is ignoring the West Bank, where chaos is quickly mounting. If wide-scale violence erupts there, it could quickly bury the entire peace process.
