Since its creation, the IMF has seen its global mission overcome by floating exchange rates and immense private capital markets. Consequently, it has focused more on the developing world, become more politicized, and wandered into riskier endeavors such as Mexico's bailout. Nevertheless, the IMF can and should be reformed to become a global rating agency, a bankruptcy judge for nations, and an international catalyst for aid and financial packages.
Zanny Minton-Beddoes writes on international economics for The Economist. She was on the staff of the IMF from 1992 to 1994.
At their next summit in Halifax this June, the leaders of the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations have set themselves the task of revising the Bretton Woods framework, which is widely credited as a foundation of the postwar economic prosperity among Western nations. High on their agenda should be reform of one of its main components, the International Monetary Fund.
Why reform the IMF? The current international economic environment is more hopeful than ever before. For the first time, the overwhelming majority of the world's population lives in some form of market economy. The industrial world enjoys a rare combination of growth and low inflation; the "Washington consensus," a model of economic development that emphasizes macroeconomic discipline and open markets, is being adopted by more countries. The IMF played crucial roles in the 1980s debt crisis and in the transformation of former communist economies. Radical change, many might argue, is neither necessary nor desirable.
Such complacency is misplaced. There is a gulf between the rhetoric and reality of the IMF's role, a gulf that has been emerging since the fixed exchange rate system broke down in the early 1970s but which is proving increasingly hazardous. The growth of capital markets has rendered the organization impotent in industrialized countries; the world's richest economies neither borrow from the IMF nor are they required to follow its policy advice. Its role in the developing world is worrisomely unclear. The Mexican crisis earlier this year is a case in point. The IMF proved wholly inadequate at crisis prevention (it did not foresee the Mexican debacle), and its attempts at crisis resolution were dangerously improvised (it pledged a disproportionate share of its liquid resources to Mexico, breaking all existing rules on the limits of financial support).
In the world's poorest countries it has effectively become a development institution with a narrow macroeconomic focus. This role is a far cry from the original notion of providing countries with temporary financial support and raises the question of overlap with the World Bank. The IMF is floundering as it looks for a role.
THE MODERN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
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The global financial turmoil that began in Thailand in 1997 has forced the international community to reevaluate the institutions, structures, and policies aimed at crisis prevention and resolution. In September 1998 President Clinton suggested that a distinguished private-sector group assess the need for reform of the international financial architecture. With this concern in mind, the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored the Independent Task Force on the Future of the International Financial Architecture, cochaired by Peter G. Peterson, chairman of both the Council and the Blackstone Group and secretary of commerce during the Nixon administration, and Carla A. Hills, CEO of Hills & Co. and U.S. Trade Representative during the Bush administration.
Initially devised to maintain a system of fixed exchange rates, the IMF took on a new role during the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s-providing moderate amounts of credit, facilitating debt renegotiations, and recommending responsible macroeconomic policies. But the IMF is also applying the lessons of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where a fundamental economic restructuring was necessary, to Asia. So in Korea, for example, the fund called for reform of inefficient conglomerates and inflexible labor laws. However beneficial in the long run, such changes are not needed to resolve the current crisis. By stepping in too far and too soon, the IMF discourages countries from seeking modest help. Even worse, it encourages bankers to undertake more risky loans, making another crisis more likely.
The international financial community can assess its management of the international debt "crisis" of 1982-83 with a certain sense of satisfaction. Creative ad hoc solutions to individual countries' problems kept adequate credit flowing. Unpredecented cooperation among the International Monetary Fund (IMF), central banks, and private lenders restored confidence and prevented the "crisis" from playing out to a tragic conclusion--massive defaults, the freezing of new credit, bank failures, and perhaps ultimately a worldwide depression.

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