The United States, Japan, and Asia; The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan, and the United States in East Asia
The book edited by Curtis offers eight thoughtful essays, which focus on challenges to U.S. policy in the Pacific and stress the critical importance of U.S.-Japan relations. Particularly important is how the United States and Japan relate to China. Virtually all the contributors agree with Tom McNaugher's conclusion that "the central strategic challenge in East Asia" is coaxing China into a constructive, cooperative regional and global role. Both Akira Iriye and Michel Oksenberg provide the historical background demonstrating the dangers of the United States and Japan going separate ways in dealing with China, as they did in the 1930s. As Oksenberg points out, however, the United States and Japan will have to deal with a China that is "culturally confident but socially undisciplined, economically vibrant but politically messy, huge in size but territorially amorphous."
Despite these difficulties, there is room for cautious optimism. Both the United States and Japan are aware that China will be a difficult partner to deal with in world affairs, and they are both conscious of the need for consultation, dialogue, and a mixture of realism, patience, and firmness.
The book edited by Mandelbaum explores some of the same ground but concentrates on the interactions among the four major powers in the region--Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. The essays in this volume are also of uniformly high quality. Richard Solomon offers a concluding chapter that aptly sums up the situation: "The most promising future one can anticipate for the coming period in East Asia is that of a loose balance of power among the states of the Strategic Quadrangle."
Related
The rioting crowds that clamored at the gates of the Japanese Diet building in May and June and the throngs of Zengakuren students who snake-danced wildly down the streets of Tokyo and swarmed over Hagerty's car at Haneda Airport have given pause to many persons in both the United States and Japan. . . . Never since the end of the war has the gap in understanding between Americans and Japanese been wider than over this incident. . . .
The provisions of the Japanese Constitution barring the resort to war as an instrument of Japanese policy, and effectively committing Japan not to maintain armed forces on a major scale, has long raised the question how Japan's security is to be assured in a world still replete with sources of international conflict. As late as 1948 it was still General MacArthur's view, if the writer of these lines understood him correctly, that it would not be essential for the United States to maintain armed forces on the Japanese archipelago permanently or for a protracted time either for its own security or for that of Japan; in his view, the most suitable status for Japan would be one of permanent demilitarization and neutralization under such general protection as might be afforded by the United Nations and by the friendly interest of the United States. He appeared to believe, as did this writer, that if such a status could be arranged with the concurrence of the Soviet Government, the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Japan would be minimal; and it was not easy to see from what other quarter Japan could be seriously threatened. This concept assumed, of course, an eventual agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States and other interested parties, on the terms of a Japanese peace settlement.
After more than a quarter-century of formally close contact, the real relationship of the American and the Japanese peoples is like that of two men observing each other through the flawed glass and distorting mirrors of a fun-house. Their perspectives are strikingly, sometimes absurdly different Our dealings of the last 25 years-one war, a successful occupation, unnumbered seminars, government conferences, student exchanges and an $11 billion yearly trade relationship-seem not to have clarified the view.
