Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits
The deficiencies of this volume highlight the need for a balanced and sober account of recent relations between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. First, there is a pretentious emphasis on the part of the editors and some of the contributors on exploring the Taiwan-PRC relationship in order to make theoretical contributions to the study of international politics. The result is a volume whose reach far exceeds its grasp. Second, by placing their emphasis on theory, the editors miss a good opportunity to assess the policy options for the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States. Finally, the volume has too much of a pro-Taiwan slant.
Despite these problems, there are a few informative essays. John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, a political science professor in Taiwan, contributes a cogent essay on the people involved in the making of Taiwan's mainland policy. He shows a continuum with those who seek reunification at one end and those who seek independence at the other. But the vital middle ground is held by the mainstream faction of the ruling party, the Nationalist Party (KMT), led by President Lee Teng-hui. This group favors opening up to the mainland but only at a slow pace. Parris Chang has also written an informative essay on Taiwan's "flexible diplomacy" toward the PRC that has now led to a substantial growth of indirect trade and investment on the mainland and a lifting of the travel ban. But Chang agrees with Hsieh that Taiwan's opening to the PRC will be very cautious for at least two reasons. KMT officials are fearful of undermining Taiwan's stability and security. They see direct trade and direct investments as Taiwan's bargaining chips to secure concessions.
Related
The defense of Taiwan remains at the heart of the issue of China. The recent initiatives of Peking and Washington, and the impending presidential visit, have inspired hopeful speculation. Discussion has centered on formulas for recognition and entry into the United Nations. Our alliance with the Republic of China on Taiwan has been given less consideration, and its implications are optimistically avoided. But our security relationship with Taiwan-in particular the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954-dictates certain diplomatic solutions and precludes others. Definitive choices will have to be made, and illusions of entertaining contradictory positions will have to be abandoned. If the consequences of our defense arrangement are not grasped, and the problems not deliberately resolved, the expectations that have been aroused may be unfulfilled, and the United States may proceed to underwrite a new order in East Asia that offers at best a tense military equilibrium and perpetual American involvement in the political evolution of the region.
Taiwan's campaign to return to the United Nations merits serious attention. China is hurting its own interests by failing to understand the factors--most important, the democratization of Taiwan--that drove Taipei to seek membership. Taiwan knows that the road to the United Nations ultimately goes through Beijing, and China can promote the goal of eventual reunification if it endorses Taiwan's bid. Given that Taipei has made its U.N. participation negotiable, Beijing should recognize the opening that is being presented.
Although Beijing is usually thought of as the villain, Taipei, provocatively moving toward independence, must be reined in.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.