Latin America the Morning After: Euphoric Perceptions, Fragile Realities
When thinking about Latin America, despair can be as disorienting as optimism. In the early 1990s, economic euphoria reigned in Latin America. Then came Mexico. The current gloom--the Tequila effect--will also pass. The recent wave of reforms dealt swiftly with such problems as inflation, low exports, currency instability, capital flight, and the boosting of regional trade. But to ensure prosperity after the peso debacle, Latin America must address its underlying woes: poverty, low productivity, and chronically ineffectual civic institutions.
Moisés Naím is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Chair of its Latin American programs. Formerly, he was Minister of Industry of Venezuela and Executive Director of the World Bank.
Bewildered by the bizarre turn of events in Mexico, novelist Gabriel García Márquez told his colleague Carlos Fuentes that they should throw their books into the sea. "We have been totally defeated by reality," said García Márquez.
If Latin American realities defeat novelists with the magical imagination of García Márquez, foreign investors and policymakers are much easier prey. In mid-1994, the Financial Times warned that, "For those that think of Latin America in terms of generals, jungles, and sackfuls of worthless currency, it may be a time to overhaul some myths. Things have changed. South America's soldiers have long since goose-stepped back to the barracks, their power usurped by squadrons of technocrats and battalions of economic miracle-makers." Less than six months later, however, the same newspaper informed its readers that "Mexico's currency crisis has dimmed expectations for economies throughout Latin America. The crisis and the border war which flared up in January between Peru and Ecuador have raised some fundamental questions in the minds of investors about the wisdom of investment in Latin America. Given the losses they have suffered, some may well retire from the region for good."
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Democracy and debt were a macabre pas de deux in South America during 1983. As military regimes withdrew in disgrace (Argentina), further liberalized (Brazil), or tried to cope with vigorous popular pressures to restore democracy (Uruguay and Chile), that welcome news was haunted by the growing social and political implications of the continent's economic difficulties. The growing foreign debt burden has become the most visible manifestation of the current economic crisis, the worst in more than 50 years.
The substantive and procedural problems of Latin American development are hard enough. Harder still is the inseparable task of understanding the social and psychological problems well enough to begin coping with them. With Latin America, we do not have any significant difficulties in formulating goals. The 1961 Charter of Punta del Este, the lines of action agreed on by the Presidents at Punta del Este in 1967, the economic and social principles of the revised Charter of the Organization of American States-indeed the constitutions of the other American states-all support this assertion. The difficulties begin thereafter, when operations start to go forward. The problems are various, and their origins are distributed. Most of the impediments that are fairly attributable to the United States arise from that short-haul practicality all too often, and incorrectly, called "pragmatism."
There is a distinct rumble. Is it the noise of an impending second crisis of Latin American and other developing country debtors, or is it the start-up of world economic recovery, which will gradually pull lenders and borrowers alike away from the edge of a financial abyss?

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