The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union
From 1969 to 1991, if U.S. policymakers could have been flies on the wall, nowhere would they rather have been than the rooms in which their Soviet adversaries were deciding their next steps in strategic arms negotiations. General Detinov, a representative of the defense industrial sector in the party apparat, was at the center of these deliberations, first as a key player in the critical five-agency group staffing the ultimate decision-makers during the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, and eventually as the number-two man in the Soviet delegation to the intermediate-range nuclear forces talks.
In the forward, Paul Nitze describes Detinov as a negotiator of integrity who cared about the truth and avoided gamesmanship, a characterization the text echoes. Detinov and his collaborator, an academic specialist on strategic nuclear arms, not only outline the politics and players -- and how these changed over time -- but they provide considerable insight into the reasons the Soviets did what they did.
While they are frank in admitting the twisted logic in some of the demands and, at times, even prevarication of their side, in the end they do not lend much support to those who viewed the Soviet stake in strategic arms control as a cynical subterfuge to secure unilateral advantage at every turn. The truth seems to have been the opposite. Yes, Soviet leaders sought the best deal they could get and resisted yielding any of their military advantages, but, when their demands looked like an attempt to disadvantage the United States seriously, they were usually reacting to their own black, worst-case assumptions about U.S. programs and intentions. If the authors were not so candid about the Soviet position, this tale might be dismissed as the rationalizations of a participant seeking to put the best face on an enterprise in which he participated.
Related
"Gorbachev's new thinking does not indicate that the Soviet Union wishes to abandon its role as a world power, but it provides a different picture of the world and redefines the Soviet role in it". Discusses (1) the failure of Brezhnev's foreign policy (2) Gorbachev's redefinition of Soviet thinking on international relations (3) new principles of defensive sufficiency (4) effects on arms control (5) domestic motivations. Professor of political science, Harvard University.
Discusses (1) the size of Soviet military forces (nuclear, naval, air and ground) (2) the ideological drive behind Soviet defence policy (3) possible future doctrinal developments. Since the late 1970s, changing technology has stimulated doctrinal change, giving rise to concepts of multi-front operations. But the doctrinal vision is at the moment unrealisable, and the Soviets may thus be seeking to reduce nuclear arsenals, so as to make defence of the rear easier in wartime. Concludes that, in the light of the continuing ideological basis of Soviet doctrine, the West must be careful not to underestimate the danger which lies behind the undermining of deterrence through badly-conceived arms control measures. Director, National Security Agency, 1985-88. Very useful analysis, recommended.
The USA continues to under-estimate the danger to world security of continuing nuclear proliferation. As it normalizes relations with the USSR, the USA should "undertake a fresh assessment of the worldwide non-proliferation effort".

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