Korea Approaches Reunification
Carefully assembling a variety of economic and demographic data, this volume contrasts South and North Korean economic and social development and advances several hypotheses about the size of North Korea's military forces and other aspects of North Korea's veiled society. In a concluding chapter, the author argues that the paramount need is to prevent war on the peninsula, and he strongly supports the deterrence policy, including U.S.-Republic of Korea security ties. But Eberstadt also calls attention to several problems in the security arrangement. First, South Korea should fully share its intelligence about North Korea with the United States rather than continuing its selective policy. Second, South Korea needs to provide for more of its own protection. And finally, Seoul should stop blaming the United States for policies it favors privately but is unwilling to embrace officially, which fans anti-Americanism in the South. The author also argues that South Korea should do much more to establish a genuine rule of law, including provisions to protect Western business. He cites several recent studies concluding that, despite legal reforms in recent years, foreign corporations in Korea are subject to government-enforced restrictions, sanctions, and punishments with no basis in written statute.
Related
Eighteen months after its enunciation at Guam the Nixon Doctrine remains obscure and contradictory in its intent and application. It is not simply that the wider pattern of war in Indochina challenges the Doctrine's promise of a lower posture in Asia. More than that, close analysis and the unfolding of events expose some basic flaws in the logic of the Administration's evolving security policy for the new decade. The Nixon Doctrine properly includes more than the declaratory policy orientation. It comprises also the revised worldwide security strategy of "1½ wars" and the new defense decision-making processes such as "fiscal guidance budgeting." These elements have received little comment, especially in their integral relation to our commitments in Asia. But the effects of this Administration's moves in these areas will shape and constrain the choices of the United States for a long time to come.
A Question recently posed by a distinguished colleague is central for anyone who earnestly seeks to understand how an entire generation of American political leaders, with the best will in the world, pushed the country onto the slippery slope that led ever downward into the engulfing morass of Indochina. The question is this: "Why did so many intelligent, experienced and humane men in government fail to grasp the immorality of our intervention in Vietnam and the cancerous division it was producing at home, long after this was instinctively evident to their wives and children?"
Last year both South and North Korea celebrated the twentieth anniversary of their establishment as separate political entities. Each had, at its inception, claimed the entire Korean nation as its legitimate domain, and each vowed to rid the other of the foreign power that was said to have created it. The year 1968 was also an anniversary of two other events. It was the 4300th anniversary of the legendary founding of the Korean nation, and the 1300th anniversary of the Silla Unification in A.D. 668, when the nation was brought under a single, centralized political rule. The irony of commemorating concurrently two decades of cold-war division and thirteen centuries of unified nationhood under a highly centralized political system was not lost on the Korean people.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.