Clinton and his team have reversed the legacy of American diplomacy. Unlike their cannier predecessors, they allow rhetoric to drive policy--not vice versa.
Jonathan Clarke is a former British diplomat. His latest book is After the Crusade: American Foreign Policy for the Post-Superpower Age, coauthored by James Clad. He is currently a Guest Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington.
In a wry comment in early 1932 on American reluctance to translate its indignant rhetoric protesting the September 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria into anything more forceful, British statesman Stanley Baldwin commented, "You will get nothing out of Washington but words--big words, but only words." This complaint rings true today. Fine promises abound in American foreign policy, but delivery--as the Bosnian government and others have discovered--is not guaranteed. With the exception of the Persian Gulf War, a consistent characteristic of recent U.S. foreign policy has been rhetoric outdistancing deeds. Expectations of decisive American action, even on supposedly vital national interests, have been raised, only to be dashed. This has been the pattern with China, Japan, Europe, Russia, and especially Bosnia.
In some ways the phenomenon is not new. A predilection for soaring oratory lies at the heart of the way the United States comports itself overseas. The rest of the world speaks unashamedly of the balance of power, the national interest, and spheres of influence. Americans have traditionally preferred a more altruistic and millennial style of oratory. Former president Richard Nixon lamented in 1980 that the American people did not respond well to the "cold cynicism of Old World Realpolitik."
WORDS DRIVING DEEDS
In an environment where oratorical excess is the norm, to convict the Clinton administration of rhetorical overkill--as many have done--is not a novel insight. However, the Clinton administration faces a more serious charge. Its rhetoric may inflict lasting damage on American interests overseas. Today's policymakers are not just participating in a slightly disreputable but time-honored national tradition of overexuberant salesmanship and self-righteous preaching. Instead, they have reversed the legacy of American diplomacy...
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