Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982
Kakar explicates the other side of the war. He turns the victims of the Soviet invasion into something other than a ferocious but faceless opposition, and indeed all Afghan parties to the conflict emerge with meaningful biographies. Not only does he convey the differences among the factions and key groups that ruled under the protection of Soviet military might, but he explains them in terms of the country's complex social and ethnic composition. More important, he draws distinctions among the Islamists, summarizing their ideas and inspiring thinkers, tracing the conflicts between them and the traditional communal leaders whom they frequently attempted to replace, and sorting out their complex connections with Afghan organizations outside the country's borders. More than anything else, the book is an account of what happened in Afghanistan--in the cities, villages, schools, refugee camps, and prisons where the author spent five years.
Kakar's attempt to explain Soviet behavior before and during the war largely fails, in part because he is simply too distant from the subject and in part because his sources represent only a fraction of those now available. Much to the author's credit, however, and notwithstanding the limited period that he covers, his elaborate sifting of who was fighting whom and for what reasons sheds great light on the violence that has continued long after the last Soviet soldier left.
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Since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, it has failed to consolidate the rule of its Marxist client in Kabul. Although there are occasional reports that the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) has increased its control, events over the last year confirm an overall lack of progress and the growing strength of the Afghan resistance. The Soviet-sponsored regime has made few political gains and its administrative and combat performance has not greatly improved--a record that led to the abrupt resignation of Afghan leader Babrak Karmal on May 4, 1986. The mujahedeen resistance, on the other hand, is more capable than ever, boosted by increasing firepower, operational and political cooperation and international support. It is slowly but steadily evolving into a powerful military force.
To wage its war in Afghanistan, the Bush administration needed Uzbekistan's help -- and promised a lot to get it. But Washington must not let this short-term marriage of convenience give Uzbekistan long-term regional hegemony. The Uzbek regime's authoritarianism fosters Islamic extremism, which in turn exacerbates tensions among Central Asia's unstable governments. Only a multilateral approach can handle the region's many problems.
The world's focus in Afghanistan is shifting from waging war to picking up the pieces and helping the long-suffering Afghan people. But can action follow words? Modern refugee crises require solutions that pair crisis response with nation building, and private agencies with national and international actors. But the organizations devoted to such tasks remain outdated, uncoordinated, and shackled by politicians and bureaucrats. The system is broken, and it cannot be fixed from within.

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