Chirac of France: A New Leader of the West?
Though initially hailed for his "bulldozer" Balkan leadership, Chirac's nuclear testing and fiscal austerity have alienated the public and cut his honeymoon short.
Dominique Moïsi is Deputy Director of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales and Editor in Chief of Politique Étrangère.
After his first six months as president of France, Jacques Chirac, like the proverbial prophet, is more honored abroad than at home. The discrepancy is sharpest with the United States, where the press has been quick to appreciate Chirac's "bulldozer" style, particularly in contrast with the wavering image of President Bill Clinton. Where Clinton has appeared undecided, if not disinterested, in foreign policy, Chirac has come across as forceful, experienced, and knowledgeable. The comparison has been a near-reversal of that purveyed by the American media 14 years ago, when François Mitterrand was first elected president of France. Dismay and anxiety greeted the coming to power of Mitterrand's socialist-communist coalition, while across the Atlantic an air of confidence surrounded the new Reagan conservative revolution with its "America is back" assertiveness.
Today the French public is far less enthusiastic about the performance of its new leader and his government. Judging from the rapid downward trend of opinion polls, Chirac has been granted the shortest honeymoon in the history of France's Fifth Republic. In part such vicissitudes reflect the difficulty of governance afflicting most of the Western democratic world in the absence of a clear external threat and in the presence of internal economic and social problems. But for a fuller explanation, one must look also to the self-willed character of Chirac and the contradictory actions of his government, headed by Prime Minister Alain Juppé.
In socioeconomic terms France perfectly illustrates the contemporary challenges of stimulating adequate economic growth while keeping inflation low, of reducing public budgets while preserving social benefits, and of satisfying a still-rigid corporatist society while fitting itself to the constraints of integration, including a common currency, envisioned in a Maastricht Europe. The greatest challenge for Chirac may lie in the contradictory nature of these goals or in the incompatibility of the means to those ends.
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The French always seem to be opposing the United States on some issue or other. They coddle Saddam Hussein and denounce American "cultural imperialism." Why is France so difficult to deal with? It is, quite simply, in a bad mood, unsure of its place and status in a new world. The French are jealous of America, which seems to run the world; afraid of globalization, which threatens to erode their culture; and ambivalent about European unification, which might drown out their voice. France must meet these challenges while struggling with a cumbersome statist economy and a rising extreme right. To do it all, France must transcend itself.
Anti-Americanism and a stubborn Gaullist independence in foreign policy have often marked French political discourse. These traits are coming to the fore once again in France's wildly popular antiglobalization movement. Today, a complex mix of political, economic, and cultural reasons explains the French resistance to "Anglo-Saxon global capitalism." If sustained, France's stand could become a model for other countries seeking an alternative to the new, American-style world economy.
The Atlantic nations are moving toward a new security relationship which may in time involve the role of European strategic nuclear forces. We are in a period of widespread questioning of the nature of future American participation in the defense of Western Europe. In the squalor of American cities, the increased racial and social tensions of our society and the demands for a shift in national priorities away from defense toward domestic problems lie the seeds of change. If we add to these the economic recovery of Europe, the U.S. view that the allies are not carrying a fair share of their own defense, the balance-of-payments deficit toward which the U.S. forces abroad make a substantial contribution, the squeeze on the Pentagon budget, the tendency resulting from the traumatic experience in Vietnam to shed responsibilities, we find the ingredients of a reduced U.S. military involvement in Europe.

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