Germany's New Ostpolitik: Changing Iran
Iran is the one sore spot in an otherwise highly cooperative German-American relationship. The United States has sought to punish the Islamic state for sponsoring terrorism. Germany has tried to maintain a "critical dialogue" of limited diplomacy and commerce, much as its Ostpolitik tried to engage Soviet bloc nations during the Cold War. U.S. officials decry Germany's shady dealings and billions of dollars in loans and credits to Iran. When challenged, German officials charge the United States with hypocrisy. Lurking behind the dispute is an uncomfortable fact: in a world without the Cold War, "rogue states" are not threatening enough to force accord among Western nations.
Charles Lane is a Senior Editor at The New Republic.
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY
German-American friendship has been a pillar of the Western alliance in the post--Cold War era, even when that alliance has been strained over issues ranging from Bosnia to trade liberalization. The U.S. and German governments have worked together on aid to Russia, NATO expansion, nuclear nonproliferation, and Middle East peace. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and U.S. President Bill Clinton enjoy a natural rapport. But when it comes to dealing with Iran, Germany and America have consistently been at odds. Although the two governments have assured each other that their objectives in southwest Asia are the same--to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons, supporting terrorism, and disrupting the Arab-Israeli peace process--they differ radically on which means to use. The United States has tried to isolate Iran diplomatically and strangle its economy. Germany--and Europe--favor engagement (what Bonn calls a "critical dialogue") built around a multibillion-dollar trade and investment relationship.
When President Clinton banned U.S. trade with, and investment in, the Islamic Republic in May, he was trying not only to punish the mullahs, but also to undercut the European policy, especially that of Germany. Only three months before, at a joint press conference at the White House, Chancellor Kohl had pointedly claimed that American oil companies did more business with Iran than German ones, and the charge of hypocrisy, leveled frequently by European officials, bothered the Clinton administration. (Until the Clinton embargo was announced, U.S. oil companies and other firms did do a substantial amount of business with Iran, as Kohl charged: in 1994, U.S. companies bought $4.3 billion worth of Iranian oil, all of it for sale in Europe since imports to the United States were banned, and sold the Iranians $300 million worth of other goods.) But even after Clinton's imposition of the embargo, Western Europe and Japan stood pat. "We do not believe that a trade embargo is the appropriate instrument for influencing opinion in Iran and bringing about changes there that are in our interests," said German Economics Minister Günter Rexrodt.
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The Clinton administration needs to lead Europe and expand NATO, but without harming ties with Russia. Washington should dispel the ambiguity created by its current waffling. The president must take a two-track approach: start the process of accepting Central European states into NATO by spelling out criteria for membership and sign a global security treaty with Russia. To make it work, Germany and Poland will have to reconcile, the West and Russia will have to soothe Ukraine, and the problem of the Baltics will have to be finessed. Only American leadership can help create a wider, safer Europe for the next century.
Despite the myriad setbacks of recent months, the U.S.-European alliance is not doomed. But repairing it will require a strategic overhaul no less bold than that which followed the end of the Cold War. The key to today's transatlantic divide is not power but purpose. To revive and revamp the alliance, therefore, the United States and the European Union must forge a new grand strategy capable of meeting the great challenges of the era: expanding the Euro-Atlantic community and stabilizing the greater Middle East.
In a major address on July 4, 1962, the President called for a partnership between the United States and Europe. With the passage of the Trade Bill this "great design" seems to have come a step closer. To many, the Atlantic Community beckons as the great hope of the 1960s. The possibility of establishing a vital Atlantic system is indeed one of the great opportunities of our time. It may well be that to future historians it will appear the distinctive feature of our decade, far transcending in importance the crises which form the headlines of the day.
