Shockproof: The End of the Financial Crisis
The peso may collapse and Barings fail, but financial markets sail along, confirming the success of international regulatory efforts begun in the 1970s.
Ethan B. Kapstein is Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. His most recent book is Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State.
The past year witnessed three of the most dramatic financial collapses since the Third World debt crisis of 1982. The meltdown of the Mexican peso in December 1994, the failure of the 233-year-old Barings Bank last February, and Daiwa Bank's $1 billion loss in November--apparently at the hands of a single trader--would all seem to point to a financial system that has spun out of control.
In June 1974, when the small German Bankhaus Herstatt floundered, the contagious effect was immediate: interest rates rose, the Euromarkets (the London-based markets for dollars and other hard currencies) shriveled, and the integrity of the American payments system was threatened. The 1982 debt crisis led to even greater anxiety about a possible catastrophe, and the payments system was kept in motion only by the injection of huge amounts of cash by the industrial countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
But last year the markets responded to these financial crises with little more than a "ho hum." In fact, the U.S. stock market boomed, and interest rates around the world declined. The Bank of England allowed Barings to fold, and nothing happened. American regulators closed Daiwa Bank's New York office, and the markets did not squeal. Both inside and outside the U.S. government and international organizations, analysts continue to debate whether the Mexican bailout was really necessary.
What explains this sea change in the reaction of international markets to financial shocks? Over the past 20 years the leading economic powers have created a regulatory structure that has permitted the financial markets to continue toward globalization without the threat of systemic collapse. The elimination of financial contagion has required painstaking efforts by dedicated public servants who have had to navigate between domestic political pressures and concerns about the well-being of the international system.
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Many economists hate to admit it, but today's economic turmoil shares some uncanny -- or downright scary -- similarities with the prelude to the Great Depression. Many policymakers seem to have unlearned the basic lesson of that calamity: boost demand in the face of an economic slowdown and reduce the volatility of capital flows. Rigid adherence to anti-inflationary policies will only deepen the crises in emerging markets. As the IMF continues to insist on fiscal austerity and many governments instinctively resist capital controls, a wider recession looms. With a distinct whiff of the 1930s in the air, we had better refresh our memories and relearn the basics of Depression economics.
The global financial turmoil that began in Thailand in 1997 has forced the international community to reevaluate the institutions, structures, and policies aimed at crisis prevention and resolution. In September 1998 President Clinton suggested that a distinguished private-sector group assess the need for reform of the international financial architecture. With this concern in mind, the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored the Independent Task Force on the Future of the International Financial Architecture, cochaired by Peter G. Peterson, chairman of both the Council and the Blackstone Group and secretary of commerce during the Nixon administration, and Carla A. Hills, CEO of Hills & Co. and U.S. Trade Representative during the Bush administration.
Attempting to prevent future financial crises by drafting new global regulations will do more harm than good. If governments adopt the same regulations, they will make the same mistakes. Instead, financial regulation must be the task of individual governments and not multilateral committees.

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