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France's Nuclear Dilemmas

By David S. Yost
January/February 1996
Article Summary and Author Biography

Ignoring worldwide protests, France conducted the first of several scheduled nuclear tests in September. The controversy has overshadowed France's more important nuclear challenges:maintaining a strong deterrent under a test ban, moving ahead with its proposals for "Europeanization" of that deterrent, and developing a consensus on how nuclear threats should be used in response to those who would brandish other weapons of mass destruction.

David S. Yost is a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School. During the 1993-94 academic year, he was a Visiting Professor and Research Associate at the Centre des Hautes Études de l'Armement, École Militaire, Paris. The views expressed are his alone and do not represent those of the Department of the Navy or any U.S. government agency.

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TESTING TIMES

France conducted an underground nuclear test in French Polynesia last September, breaking a three-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing that had been observed by the other recognized nuclear powers with the exception of China. The test, one of a series France plans to complete before it signs a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) later this year, sparked protests worldwide. Unfortunately, the controversy over the tests has overshadowed France's more fundamental and long-term nuclear dilemmas. The challenges facing France are threefold: maintaining the deterrent under a test ban, giving form to the government's vague proposals for "Europeanization," and forging agreement on the extent to which nuclear weapons could be used to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

President Jacques Chirac remains determined to complete this final test series, contending that it is needed to obtain additional data for the development of simulation capabilities, intended to enable France to do without future tests. By validating design adjustments to give the weapons greater "robustness," it can help ensure that no safety, security, or reliability problems arise as weapons age under a no-test regime. The tests also aim to qualify the new tn-75 warhead for submarine-launched missiles, expected to be in service for at least two decades.

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