The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age
Article Summary and Author Biography
Nuclear weapons were used for the first and only time in World War II, and the world has grown accustomed to their nonuse. But the overwhelming deterrent forces that worked during the Cold War will not provide protection against the new threats: terrorism and catastrophic accident. The arsenals and mindsets of the past half-century present a formidable barrier to change, but the United States must lead the way in preventing nuclear weapons from becoming acceptable.
Fred Charles Iklé was Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Reagan administration and Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under President Ford. He is affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
A PLAN TO CONTROL THE ATOMIC MENACE
Half a century after it began, the nuclear drama has reached the conclusion of its first act--a rather happy ending in spite of the gloomy prospects for civilization that darkened the stage at the outset. This respite, though, is not a lasting redemption from the dangers of nuclear warfare. Whether by accident, because of a terrorist act, or as part of a military campaign, a nuclear bomb might explode someday, unleashing forces that would transform the international system far more profoundly than did the collapse of the Soviet empire. The end of the present era, in which nuclear weapons are plentiful but never used, would be sudden, and the major nuclear powers are ill prepared for the revolution in strategic thinking this event would compel.
Fifty years ago the atomic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had an immense emotional impact. The long period of nonuse that followed has shriveled public awareness of the bomb's power to merely a faint apprehension. Just one or two destructive nuclear detonations would revive that anxiety everywhere, and Americans would find it much harder to cope with these reawakened passions than in August 1945. After their great victory in World War II, Americans rode a wave of optimism and were comforted by the knowledge that, at least for a while, no other state possessed atomic technology. Unlike after a future nuclear explosion, in 1945 there were no threats of nuclear revenge, no arsenals with thousands of nuclear warheads, no nuclear "guarantees" that had abruptly disintegrated, no disproved theories of deterrence, no failed safeguards and controls. Above all, there was no worldwide presumption of continued nonuse that had unexpectedly been shattered. Before such a calamity occurs, the United States must lead the great powers in planning for the international control of nuclear weapons.
USED TO NONUSE
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