Putting Germany Back Together: The Fabulous Bush and Baker Boys

Taking a cue from Trotsky, Gorbachev did not believe in "perestroika in one country." He identified the fate of his endeavor in the Soviet Union with renewal all the way to the Elbe; reforming the empire was, he fancied, the best way to retain it. East Germany, of course, was the most critical gamble, for it allowed Moscow to encircle and contain the unruly rest. But East Germany, a non-nation, was also the worst place for controlled change--indeed, a mission impossible. If the GDR was to move toward democratic self-determination, it could only collapse into the arms of the "real" German state, the Federal Republic.

Still, Gorbachev's bungle was understandable. Like the bulk of the West German political class--especially the chattering class--he believed that the GDR had become "real," that "the other German state" was here to stay, particularly because all Bonn governments from Brandt to Kohl had scrupulously deferred to Soviet sensibilities by basing their Ostpolitik on the incantation, "two states in one nation." Nor was Mikhail Sergeyevich alone in placing so sanguine a bet. As this book recounts in great detail, Margaret Thatcher was adamant about braking, if not stopping, unification; French President François Mitterrand, delivering sibylline homilies, certainly hoped for the same; and West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and for a while even Helmut Kohl himself, were either too confused or too scared to commit.

The second explanation for the fortuitous denouement is George Bush or, more accurately, his right instincts at the right time. Egged on by Kohl, and against the advice of National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State James Baker, Bush went on record as early as October 24, 1989--16 days before the fall of the wall--with a verbal volley heard round the world: "I don't share the concern that some European countries have about a reunified Germany." By moving out in front, Washington did what should come naturally (Mr. Clinton, please take note) to the sole remaining superpower. By forcing the pace, Bush grabbed hold of the baton; by siding with Kohl, he tightened the bond with the soon-to-be number one power in Europe; and by securing both Bonn and the baton, the United States clinched control over the Western orchestra. Even à deux, France and Britain were too weak to impose a dissonant melody, and since Bonn could rely only on Washington, the United States acquired ample leverage over Germany to prevent it from playing solo in those heady but treacherous days.

CATASTROPHE AVERTED

The Soviet Union was the next--and most critical--problem. Because Gorbachev had blundered badly during the overture, he might try even harder to recoup his losses later. In a December 1989 meeting with Genscher, after Kohl had sprung his Ten Point Plan for confederation on a startled world, Gorbachev railed about a German "ultimatum, a diktat." Did Kohl think he could recast Europe on his own? This was exactly what the British and French were asking. "Perhaps," Gorbachev snarled, "he thinks that his melody, the melody of his march, is already playing and he is already marching to it."

For diplomatic history aficionados, these sections of the book, though rendered in measured prose, read almost like a thriller. The players could no longer foresee, let alone forestall, the next day's events as Europe's deep-frozen structures began to crack open. While the once stolid but now giddy West Germans swiftly and fecklessly forged ahead, the Soviets were digging in for battle, warning that Europe could again come to "ruin on German soil," in the words of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The climate, as even Kohl noted, was turning "icy."

In the meantime, the GDR, an artfully decorated Potemkin village, was collapsing, with emigration shooting up to 60,000 per month, twice the rate that had prompted the Berlin Wall in 1961. Clearly it was now up to the United States to coax, reassure, and constrain the Soviet Union. Exploiting their comparative advantage, Zelikow and Rice describe in fine detail the debates and battles inside the foreign policy apparatus--within and between State and the National Security Council. In the end, boldness won again, and U.S. policy proceeded on the (correct) premise that "reunification was coming rapidly, not gradually." The task, not exactly a small one, was threefold: avert a German solo run to Moscow, do not drive the Soviets to desperation, and bring a united Germany into natl.

The first part was the easiest. The United States, as Bush wrote to Kohl, would not "allow the Soviet Union ... to force you to create the kind of Germany Moscow might want, at the pace Moscow might prefer." By supporting Bonn, the United States was able to determine both the speed and the direction of West German policy. After some equivocation, Bonn decided that a quick and dirty deal with Moscow was not its best course, and so Genscher, though drawn by penchant and practice to obfuscation, declared at the end of January 1990, "We do not want a united Germany that is neutral." -2

How would the United States cushion the blow for the loser? "The odds of success seemed long," write the authors, "but the United States set its sights on creating a dignified way out for Moscow to accept the unraveling of its presence and its authority in the new Europe." The Soviets scrambled to regain their footing, demanding a long transition period synchronized with moves toward their ancient goal, an "overarching" European security structure sans alliances in which the Soviet Union, by dint of propinquity and size, would predominate. Certainly a reunified Germany could not be part of natl; that would be an "unacceptable shift in the balance of power," Gorbachev adviser Vadim Zagladin warned the Americans.