The Schuman Plan and the British Abdication of Leadership in Europe
A formidable indictment of Britain's historic failure to endorse the Schuman plan for a coal and steel community and thus join the continental effort at political reconciliation and economic integration. Edmund Dell, a scholar and former minister in the Wilson and Callaghan governments, points out the lack of imagination and clumsiness of Bevin's diplomacy toward Europe. Resentment against the failure of the French to give advance notice of their plan to London, and hostility to a supranational authority, became the driving forces for rejection. Dell argues that Britain, by taking part in the negotiations, could have influenced the institutional outcome and thus remained a key player in the European game instead of abandoning the leadership to France. He does a subtle and perceptive job of analyzing the reasons for British complacency. The British had a sense of superiority toward the continentals, a profound distrust of Germany, and a lack of sympathy for the Catholic statesmen across the channel. They also feared interference with their socialist policies, their relations with the commonwealth, and their dollar account. Finally, there was a certain contempt for Europe's socialists, a conviction that left to themselves the continentals would fail, and a resentment toward America's bossiness. (Washington's pressure for a federal Europe wounded British pride.) Dell's examination of the diplomatic record, of the Labour party's stand, and of the press is devastating.
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Politically, Western Europe is enfeebled if not paralyzed. And the dilemma of the world's most civilized concentration of peoples, deploying more economic power than any region save North America, is more than paradoxical. It is disturbing and potentially troublesome. One wonders if there is still time for Europeans to do anything about it, and, if so, what. Western Europe is caught up in fresh political currents strong enough to restrain any serious efforts by the European Community to enlarge significantly the political influence of the member states and to reduce their dependence on America.
I write this article not long after my visit to France, where I spent seven eventful days of great political importance. One essential purpose of my visit was to demonstrate to the German and French peoples and, indeed, to the whole world that the reconciliation between the two neighboring peoples on both sides of the Rhine has now become a reality.
Franco-German relations are at once much better and much worse than is generally imagined in the United States. Better, because the frigid atmosphere and tensions of 1964-1965 obscure the solidity of the links forged between France and the Federal Republic. Worse, because these tensions are not solely attributable to General de Gaulle but are the expression of a profound divergence in perspective.
