Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990
A seemingly narrow, albeit intriguing social science puzzle turns into, as Woodward attacks it, a sweeping exploration of fundamental assumptions of the postwar Yugoslav state. Her puzzle is how a socialist regime, whose reason for being held a promise of full employment, managed to survive politically with a rate of unemployment that eventually exceeded everyone else's, including the most anti-labor West European societies.
She finds the answer in a trap that Tito's regime set for itself, which not only led to unemployment, while allowing the state to deflate its political effect, but eventually to the collapse of the country. The trap originated in the regime's unnatural need to find resources abroad for its two most precious but uneasily related goals: economic growth and national defense. Unable to achieve self-sustaining export-led growth, the regime ran ever harder to keep the foreign credits and technology flowing. The consequences were rising unemployment and an increasingly pathological warping and weakening of the structures and ethos that had allowed the regime to survive.
Woodward's argument is big and bold, challenging almost every major interpretation, from capitalist assumptions misapplied in a reform socialist context by outside analysts, to explanations of the sources of Yugoslavia's particular dilemmas and failures, to the meaning of Tito's death in the ungluing of the country. It is intellectual discourse at a high level, marred, alas, by writing that in difficult conceptual passages blocks understanding.
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Peace in the Balkans depends on economic stability and prosperity for all. To overcome the legacies of failed economic reforms and ethnic strife, southeastern Europe needs nothing short of a European "New Deal." Sound money and free trade can take root in the Balkans only if the EU expands the euro and its trade arrangements to the region promptly, with no strings attached. But the EU's current approach, which attaches conditions to membership in its elite clubs, falls far short.
What is happening in the political and economic arena in Jugoslavia today should not be haughtily dismissed as the result of disruptive ideological disagreement among self-righteous Marxist factions. Nor is it a reflection of the evil influence of foreign propaganda, Communist or anti-Communist. Nor has it grown out of mischievous activity of reactionary forces eager to achieve the restoration of the old régime.
The NATO war in Kosovo did not come out of the blue. The alliance fought only after Belgrade turned a deaf ear to diplomacy, and NATO knew the risks it was running. But doing nothing would have been worse; assenting to Slobodan Milosevic's mass killings would have dangerously undermined the credibility of Western institutions.
