International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods
A fine account of international monetary affairs from the end of the Second World War to the early 1990s. The International Monetary Fund commissioned the study for its 50th anniversary and gave James access to its files and full scholarly independence, and he was also able to consult with many leading participants. The book focuses on the monetary aspects of international relations, with little attention to international trade, bilateral aid, attempts at economic coercion, and the like. It also tends to keep the IMF at center stage, although it also covers events (for example, the 1992 crisis in the European Monetary System) in which the IMF played only a minor role. The book covers the gradual change in many communist countries during the 1980s and early 1990s but only touches on the major transformation to market economies in the 1990s, which represents the most challenging assignment to date for the IMF, including the debt crises of the 1980s. A historian, James is evenhanded and does not typically take sides in the many disagreements that engaged economists and financial officials throughout the period.
Related
A debate is unfolding over a new IMF proposal to avert future Argentina-style financial meltdowns: an international "Chapter 11" that would let a country declare bankruptcy, just like a troubled firm. Such a plan would represent an improvement over the current approach -- but it will not eliminate financial crises altogether.
The debt containment policy conceived in 1982, under which repayments were financed by the creation of trade surpluses, has run its course. The question now is not only whether the big debtors will pay, but where the money will come from. There is an urgent need for innovative financial mechanisms. The new strategy should include economic reform in debtor countries, new capital in-flows and, if necessary, workable formulae for interest deferral.
The global financial crisis has eroded developing nations' faith in modern capitalism itself, and the meltdown of Brazil's currency was grim evidence that the chaos is far from over. But few lessons have been absorbed. That had better change. Key Wall Street and Washington players do agree that crisis management was muffed, the nature of contagion misunderstood, and the importance of local politics underestimated. But they argue over the pace of fiscal liberalization, the efficacy of the IMF rescues, and the importance of "moral hazard." Herewith, a politically realistic plan to bridge the gaps and gird for the next, inevitable disaster.
