The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. 4: The Gulf War
Fourth in a series that has covered the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1973 through 1989, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Afghan and Falklands wars, this is a crushingly complete and data-filled tome. Drawing on the best available sources, including government reports, journalistic coverage, memoirs, and interviews, the authors have amassed an enormous amount of material on the Persian Gulf War. More a reference volume with a technical focus than a book to be read from beginning to end, it none-the-less contains interesting analytical sections and deals well with issues of high policy and strategy. It is, in short, a comprehensive guide to the war, which should stand for some years to come as a most useful work on the subject.
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Donald Rumsfeld has gotten better press as a secretary of war than he did as a secretary of defense. But the latter job is tougher, so he deserves some sympathy. The dilemmas of U.S. defense policy today reflect more than individual foibles and the difficulty of transforming a giant, often dysfunctional bureaucracy. Even more important, they stem from America's profoundly ambivalent and only semiconscious acceptance of its unique, world-historical role. Whatever the pace at which the Pentagon adapts to that fact, it must do so, and the more swiftly the better.
One does not rise through the bureaucracy as spectacularly as Colin Powell has without shrewd insight into of the game of government. But to understand Powell's views on issues ranging from the use of force to civilian control of the military, one has to return to his foot-soldier origins.
Despite a vast budget that dwarfs the military spending power of both friends and foes, the U.S. military today remains stuck in the past. American strategy still relies on a Cold War-era view of the world, and U.S. technology is ill-suited to current missions. Meanwhile, demoralization is creeping through the ranks. The next president must seize the opportunity to remake the military by forcing it to focus on the missions of the future rather than those of the past. The alternative -- more of the same -- is too dangerous to consider.
