Mexico's Circle of Misery: How U.S. Bailouts Postpone Reform
Mexico has suffered through four major crises in the past two decades, but the current round, triggered by the 1994 collapse of the peso, is the most serious. Although Mexico will avoid a social explosion, it will not embark on the thorough reform it desperately needs. The reason: a large, broad minority that depends on the United States and is mainly indifferent to their country's ups and downs, economic and political. Successive American bailouts have spared Mexicans some pain but have also locked in misguided policies and an authoritarian government. Until bold new leaders arise, Mexico is condemned to repeat its sad history.
Jorge G. Castaneda is Professor of Political Science at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. His latest book, The Mexican Shock (New Press, 1995), will be released in paperback this fall.
Since the debacle of December 1994, when the peso collapsed and Mexico nearly defaulted on its debt, the country has suffered a series of blows to its self-confidence and stability. Mexico has been through crises before-in 1976, 1982, and 1987-88-but the current situation is far more precarious. The country is mired in its 15th year of economic stagnation, corruption has reached unprecedented depths, public cynicism about government has grown, and political violence has returned. Mexico was never the paragon of middle-class serenity, well-being, and modernity that its champions abroad claimed, but its social cleavages and tensions are more serious than ever.
Nevertheless, the imminent explosion that many have predicted will not take place. And though optimists have argued that the Mexican economy is back on track and that the overhaul of the political system has begun, the country is not poised for rapid political reform and economic growth. Rather, as long as Mexico delays the changes that will bring prosperity to all, the country will remain stalled, divided between a minority whose lot depends on the United States and a majority periodically buffeted by economic and political crisis. Until a new generation of bold leaders arises, Mexico will simply muddle through, enacting superficial reforms while failing to confront its imposing dilemmas.
Not since the late 1920s has Mexico suffered so lengthy an economic depression. Per capita income is, in constant dollars, lower today than in 1980. Mexicans purchased fewer automobiles in 1995 than in 1981, even though the country's population grew by nearly half during that time, from 66 million to 95 million. President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Léon correctly points out that only through sustained economic expansion of at least five percent per year will the standard of living of all Mexicans rise, but the last time the economy grew at that rate for two consecutive years was in 1980-81. Even the most sanguine projections foresee no growth in per capita income during Zedillo's six-year term.
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The U.S.-led effort to revive the peso staved off a Great Depression in Mexico. The Mexican economy is turning the corner and paying off its debt to the United States. Mexico was not broke last year; it faced a liquidity crisis. Clinton's action ensured that economic reform in Mexico--and other developing nations--continues.
The United States is spreading its aid and efforts too thin in the developing world. It should focus on a small number of "pivotal states": countries whose fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding region and ultimately the stability of the international system. The list should include Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. A discriminating strategy for shoring up the developing world is a wise way to address traditional security threats and new transnational issues; it might be thought of as the new, improved domino theory. If effective, it could forestall the move in Congress to wipe out nearly all foreign aid.
The Salinas regime has ardently pursued the North American Free Trade Agreement as a silver bullet to kill myriad political and economic problems. But NAFTA as it stands would exacerbate many of Mexico's enduring disparities and injustices. Short term adjustment costs and the possibility of backsliding on political reform have largely been overlooked. NAFTA must be designed to contribute to political reform. Otherwise, postponing the accord would not weaken Mexico-only Salinas.
