Power and Prosperity: Economics and Security Linkages in Asia-Pacific
Although some of these conference essays, drafted in 1992, may have been updated, in general they show the dangers of a four-year gap between writing and publication. For example, although several papers touch on PRC-Taiwan interaction, most of them suggest that increasing trade and investment relations are likely to have a benign effect on the political relationship. There is little hint of what happened in 1995-96 -- the largest military crisis in the Taiwan Strait since the late 1950s -- when Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui visited the United States in 1995, the Chinese then conducted military exercises and fired test missiles near Taiwan, and the United States sent two carrier battle groups to the South China Sea. Only one of the essays -- by Shirk and Jia Qingguo -- considers the potential for conflict, and it locates the main cause in what it calls "asymmetric interdependence." What triggered the recent crisis in fact was Beijing's fear that Taiwan was moving toward a kind of "creeping independence," supported by the United States, and its determination to draw a line in the sand. Still, many of the essays are of high quality, and there is an insightful introduction by the editors on the links between economics and security.
Related
The simmering dispute over the status of Taiwan may soon explode in violence. The Chinese regime sees Taiwan's recent democratization as an implicit challenge to its own authority and legitimacy and thus continues to threaten and intimidate the island. Meanwhile, Taiwan has procured advanced defensive weapons from the United States. Growing tensions across the Taiwan Strait, along with the lack of military and diplomatic communication, make conflict -- possibly involving the United States -- increasingly likely. To avoid such an outcome, Washington should actively facilitate cross-strait dialogue and deter provocations by either side. But it must do so soon, for both China and Taiwan are growing impatient.
China's saber-rattling over its "renegade province" ignores Taiwan's decades of democracy. If Beijing wants one China, it should conciliate, not intimidate.
Can Mao or the inheritors of Mao's authority entertain the possibility of some "separateness" for any Chinese within his egalitarian One China world? The answer to this question will influence Peking's attitudes toward peaceful coexistence with Taipei, intellectual and cultural diversities at home, and possibilities for future organization of China's economic system.

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