The end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf conflict sparked the Madrid conference, formal peace between Israel and Jordan, and some autonomy for the West Bank. But those days have gone. Even if Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu had lost the election, Arab countries would still be more preoccupied with economic problems, internal political challenges, and security threats from Iraq and Iran. But the end of the era of treaties need not be the end of the peace process. The plo should discourage violence against Israel, and Israel should disrupt Syrian support for Hezbollah. The United States must maintain the principle of territory for peace.
Richard N. Haass, a principal adviser on the Middle East to President George Bush, is Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.
BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR
It has been a remarkable five years in the Middle East. Beginning in October 1991, when Arabs and Israelis first met face to face in Madrid, it went on to include two Israeli-PLO accords, an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, two grand regional economic conferences, the repeal by the U.N. General Assembly of the 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism, serious peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, and decisions by several Arab states and many other governments around the world to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. For the first time in modern history, it did not sound foolish to speak of solving the Middle East problem.
That era, if five years can be said to qualify as an era, is over. Several factors account for this abrupt end, not just the June 1996 election of a more conservative Israeli government. Indeed, the era of treaties in the Middle East might well have come to an end even if the Labor government of Shimon Peres had triumphed at the polls. The inability to conclude new treaties will have profound consequences for both the peace process and peace itself. But the end of the era of treaties does not have to lead to the demise of either peace or the peace process if the parties and diplomats involved do not act as if nothing has changed or everything is lost. What is called for is a new approach to diplomacy, one more modest in what it attempts but no less demanding in what it will require.
FROM MADRID TO OSLO
What made the era of treaties and other agreements possible, above all, was the end of the Cold War and the trauma of the Persian Gulf War. Arab governments lost their Soviet benefactor, and Iraq, the center of secular Arab radicalism, was thrashed on the battlefield. Meanwhile, most Arab governments came to accept Israel as a permanent, if not welcome, reality. Palestinians faced two additional problems: the PLO lost its Arab financial backers in the Persian Gulf region when it made the mistake of backing Saddam Hussein in his bid to conquer Kuwait, and the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, was losing steam.
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Presents the Zionist case against an independent Palestinian state and argues, on historical and security grounds, for Israeli retention of control over the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza.
Palestinian critique of US and Israeli policy concludes that "a Palestinian state in the occupied territories within the 1967 frontiers in peaceful coexistence alongside Israel is the only 'conceptual' candidate for a historical compromise". For French version see 'Vers la paix en Terre Sainte' Politique Etrangère 53/2 Summer 1988 pp349-364, 1 ref.
Gives the official Israeli view of the Palestinian issue, Jewish immigration to Israel, and relations with USSR and USA. Considers that an independent Palestinian state would be little more than a haven for terrorists. Concludes with a vigorous defence of Zionism. Prime minister of Israel.

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