Misreading Reagan's Legacy: A Truly Conservative Foreign Policy
William Kristol and Robert Kagan are right: defense spending has been cut too much. But their call for a defense budget increase that could hit $80 billion annually risks arousing opponents of a strong national defense. Misrepresenting the Reagan legacy, their crusade does a grave disservice to the conservative movement.
William Kristol and Robert Kagan's vision of a Pax Americana helps further the ever unsettled debate over America's role in the post -Cold War world ("Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," July/August 1996). But in attempting a conservative policy with a "moral clarity," they have offered an approach that is low on strategic clarity, and not very conservative to boot.
Kristol and Kagan are on target when they assert that conservatives need a foreign policy vision to achieve a lasting political realignment; no American political movement worth its name can succeed solely on domestic issues. Critics like us are sympathetic to their overriding purpose: to find an inspirational vision to sustain support for American engagement in world affairs.
Unlike some cheap-hawk conservatives, the authors advocate a much higher defense bill to make America a hegemonic power. They rightly worry that deep cuts in the military are putting the United States on the path to decline, and they understand that it is downright silly to propose, as the Clinton administration has, grand strategies of enlarging the world's democracies and becoming a global peacekeeper without embarking on a military buildup.
THE PERILS OF ESCAPISM
But Kristol and Kagan's vision of American foreign policy is without limits or constraints. It is somewhat confusing to discover that the government that runs too much of America runs too little of the world. It is fine with us if leaders use American power and influence to accomplish traditional foreign policy tasks like deterring aggression, defeating enemy nations, shoring up alliances, and expanding free trade. But we wonder what limits Kristol and Kagan would impose on their global democratic enterprise -- one that ultimately would have the U.S. government engineering the domestic transformation of nations around the globe...
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Conventional wisdom holds that Bill Clinton presided over a disastrous downsizing of the U.S. military. But this claim is wrong. In fact, Clinton's Pentagon maintained high levels of readiness and enacted a bold military modernization program that bore fruit in Bosnia and Kosovo -- and in Afghanistan and Iraq.
No single successor to the containment doctrine could possibly guide U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. Instead, American policymakers must distinguish between the means and ends of policy and strike the proper balance between the contending schools of thought in each. The task is to fashion a sturdy intellectual framework for policy, one weighted in favor of American leadership and "augmented realism." But the drift toward short-term ad hocracy simply will not do.
President Clinton and the Republican Congress do not agree on much, but both want to give the Pentagon more than it dared hope for in the post--Cold War era: some $260 billion a year. The Joint Chiefs say the United States should be ready to fight two wars at once, but would this really take as many troops as they claim, and is it even reasonable to plan for it? Look around at what allies and enemies are spending. Election time, however, is almost here, and politics in the defense debate has seldom run higher. What makes no strategic sense is good on the hustings.
