The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament
The bulky reference works that crowd the shelves of defense analysts should, and soon will, give way to products like the CD-ROM version of this annual guide. On a current- generation computer it afforded quick searching by country, ship type, aircraft, photo, line drawing, and other criteria. The information could then be printed. Although there are some drawbacks (line drawings were blurred), by and large this is an easier reference work to handle than the heavy tomes it replaces. Before too long, one hopes, even more sophisticated products (which show movement, for example, or allow a reader-viewer to examine an object from different angles) will appear. This compact disk merely duplicates the content of the book, albeit with the advantage of a computer's ability to search swiftly through large amounts of data. The next generation of products should exploit those areas in which computers can outperform their print competitors. At $495.00, however, this item will remain out of the price range of most potential purchasers other than research institutions.
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Whether or not the United States today should be called an empire is a semantic game. The important point is that it resembles previous empires enough to make the search for lessons of history worthwhile. Overwhelming dominance has always invited hostility. U.S. leaders thus must learn the arts of imperial management and diplomacy, exercising power with a bland smile rather than boastful words.
Despite a vast budget that dwarfs the military spending power of both friends and foes, the U.S. military today remains stuck in the past. American strategy still relies on a Cold War-era view of the world, and U.S. technology is ill-suited to current missions. Meanwhile, demoralization is creeping through the ranks. The next president must seize the opportunity to remake the military by forcing it to focus on the missions of the future rather than those of the past. The alternative -- more of the same -- is too dangerous to consider.
Donald Rumsfeld has gotten better press as a secretary of war than he did as a secretary of defense. But the latter job is tougher, so he deserves some sympathy. The dilemmas of U.S. defense policy today reflect more than individual foibles and the difficulty of transforming a giant, often dysfunctional bureaucracy. Even more important, they stem from America's profoundly ambivalent and only semiconscious acceptance of its unique, world-historical role. Whatever the pace at which the Pentagon adapts to that fact, it must do so, and the more swiftly the better.

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