The Dawn of Peace in Europe
The theme of this clearly and convincingly argued book is that, however disorderly the rest of the world may be, "there was, and is, a new security order in Europe," which represents "the dawn of peace" there -- even if it cannot do much about internal violence. With the end of the Soviet empire, the return of democracy -- albeit fragile -- in Eastern Europe, and the military balance that prevails on the continent thanks to the "treaty-imposed restraints" that all European states have accepted, an almost unprecedented common security order is now in place. NATO plays a major role in this order but would jeopardize the "best of all possible worlds" by "either the contraction or the expansion of its membership." The strength of the argument lies not only in Mandelbaum's skillful demonstration of it, but also in his careful analysis of the agreements negotiated in the 1980s and 1990s and the way they have contributed to NATO's "defense dominance." Mandelbaum's critique of NATO expansion remains as trenchant and sensible as it was when he presented it last year. As for Russia, he argues, rightly, that its future will largely be determined by internal developments, but adds that a continuing American military engagement in NATO will play an important role in preventing Russia from becoming a source of European instability once again.
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The history of the Atlantic Alliance is a history of crises. But we must distinguish between the routine difficulties engendered by Western Europe's dependence on the United States for its security, as well as by the economic interdependence of the allies, and major breakdowns or misunderstandings which reveal not simply an inevitable divergence of interests but dramatically different views of the world and priorities. At the present time, complaints from West European leaders about the effects of high American interest rates on their economies, or about President Reagan's skeptical approach to North-South economic issues, belong in the first category. The current controversy in Europe over nuclear weapons belongs in the second, and now confronts the Alliance with one of its most dangerous tests.
The NATO war in Kosovo did not come out of the blue. The alliance fought only after Belgrade turned a deaf ear to diplomacy, and NATO knew the risks it was running. But doing nothing would have been worse; assenting to Slobodan Milosevic's mass killings would have dangerously undermined the credibility of Western institutions.
NATO began its air war against Yugoslavia with high hopes that the transatlantic relationship would find new purpose through robust humanitarian intervention. Alas, Milosevic remains as entrenched as ever. A messy diplomatic compromise is increasingly likely, but anything less than total victory will have grave consequences for America and its allies. Europe will be wary of cooperating with the United States on security and balk at future engagements that lack U.N. blessing. U.S. isolationists will get plenty more grist for their mill. With its expectations set far too high, NATO will pay the price when they come crashing back to earth.
