NATO and the Have-Nots: Reassurance after Enlargement

The Atlantic alliance stands at the threshold of a historic decision to open itself to the new democracies of Eastern Europe. The NATO enlargement debate has focused on the question of which countries should be offered membership in the first round. Yet equally important is how the alliance deals with countries left out in that round -- the so-called have-nots. Those countries have read the writing on the wall, and it makes them uneasy. They are pressing for assurances that the enlargement process will eventually include them. If they feel shut out, a destabilizing backlash could materialize, undercutting support for reform and strengthening nationalist forces within these countries. At the same time, Russia is seeking to keep the door closed. If the enlargement of NATO cannot be stopped, Moscow would like to ensure that the first new members are the last.

Before the alliance can move forward with enlargement, it must formulate a strategy toward the have-nots. This is a true test of NATO's ultimate intentions; if the talk of an open door is to be more than empty rhetoric, such a strategy would make the pledge credible. Since the debate began in 1993, very different views on the scope and pace of enlargement have coexisted within and among NATO members. Although there is a consensus on extending membership to a handful of select countries in the first round, the alliance's enlargement study, completed last year, established some broad guidelines but papered over disagreement on who should be in and how to handle those left out. Now that the process is moving from declarations of intent to action, members must forge a clear policy toward the have-nots if NATO is to achieve its post-Cold War goal of security integration and cooperation in Europe.

NATO'S THREE-WAY DIVIDE