Heady years for arms control make a superpower complacent. The structure of restraint accepted by Washington and Moscow could crack; meanwhile, proliferation continues apace and nuclear materials trickle onto the world market. The Clinton team has followed through on the work of past negotiators, but it is high time for a third start. The United States should propose the dramatic steps of placing nuclear warheads in "strategic escrow" and banning ballistic missiles. Advanced monitoring and inspection technologies make the plan practicable, and there will be security payoffs for all.
Alton Frye is Senior Vice President and National Director of the Council on Foreign Relations.
FROM BUILD-DOWN TO STAND-DOWN
Malcolm Muggeridge once wrote of reaching a moment when he discovered that success was the hallmark of failure. That insight may yet prove to be true for the remarkable achievements in arms control in recent years.
After decades of diplomatic wrangling, breakthroughs have come on many fronts, both bilateral and multilateral. Not only have Soviets and now Russians joined Americans in agreements to make massive reductions in strategic arms, but the overwhelming majority of nations have signed on to indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Leaders in Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus have greatly contributed to the nonproliferation regime by returning thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia for safe keeping and elimination, a process to be completed this fall with the departure of the last few warheads from Belarus.
The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty has ratified and reinforced the transformation of the military balance on the continent, although the altered political landscape after the collapse of the Soviet empire will require nettlesome changes in its provisions. The long-sought Chemical Weapons Convention should enter into force shortly, and, despite India's recalcitrance, a comprehensive nuclear test ban enjoys nearly universal support.
Woven through these and other arrangements are unprecedented procedures for strict and effective verification. Particularly in the first and second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and START II), the United States and Russia are perfecting inspection techniques of far-reaching significance. Similar methods are being applied in the most difficult case of a hostile, uncooperative country, Iraq, where they have yielded crucial lessons for enforcement as well as disturbing revelations of Baghdad's habitual deceit. This progress in on-site and remote surveillance is indispensable to sustaining arms control over the long haul.
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