The Mexican Peso Crisis: International Perspectives
Roett, director of the Latin America Program at the Nitze School, warns that during President Clinton's second term the United States will need to address "the efficacy of a strong and deeper relationship with Mexico when, in the minds of many U.S. citizens, it is the problem and not part of the solution for the economic prosperity of the U.S. in the 21st century." Rogelio Ramirez de la O places considerable blame for the scale of the peso crisis on the initial inability of the Zedillo administration to understand basic market dynamics and the impact of external perceptions of the strength or weakness of the peso. He also points out that although the stabilization and adjustment program of 1995 produced current account surpluses, it impoverished millions of Mexicans. Albert Fishlow has warm praise for the American assistance program, which he says prevented the "tequila effect," the spillover of the crisis into other Latin American emerging markets, from becoming uncontrollable. Wolf Grabendorff, director of the European Institute for European-Latin American Relations, sees the European Union giving integration priority over the American emphasis on "mere free trade and capital movements."
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The United States is spreading its aid and efforts too thin in the developing world. It should focus on a small number of "pivotal states": countries whose fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding region and ultimately the stability of the international system. The list should include Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. A discriminating strategy for shoring up the developing world is a wise way to address traditional security threats and new transnational issues; it might be thought of as the new, improved domino theory. If effective, it could forestall the move in Congress to wipe out nearly all foreign aid.
The Salinas regime has ardently pursued the North American Free Trade Agreement as a silver bullet to kill myriad political and economic problems. But NAFTA as it stands would exacerbate many of Mexico's enduring disparities and injustices. Short term adjustment costs and the possibility of backsliding on political reform have largely been overlooked. NAFTA must be designed to contribute to political reform. Otherwise, postponing the accord would not weaken Mexico-only Salinas.
There is a distinct rumble. Is it the noise of an impending second crisis of Latin American and other developing country debtors, or is it the start-up of world economic recovery, which will gradually pull lenders and borrowers alike away from the edge of a financial abyss?

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