China and Korea: Dynamic Relations
This is the first volume in English to explore comprehensively China's policy toward Korea from the Korean War to the present day. Although much about the origins of the Korean War and China's subsequent involvement still remains ambiguous and imprecise, this volume brings together most of the relevant scholarship in an admirably balanced fashion. The book argues that after repeated requests from Kim Il Sung, Stalin agreed in April 1950 to support Kim's invasion plan because he did not want to be accused of hindering the "revolution" in the east, nor did he want Mao to become another Tito. Mao was fully aware of the general scenario, if not the precise timing and tactics, of Kim's invasion plan, and encouraged and assisted the military preparations. Kim Il Sung recognized signs of the incipient Stalin-Mao rivalry and adroitly manipulated the situation to obtain both leaders' support. Mao's decision to enter the Korean War was based largely on the geostrategic reality that, just as it had when Japan used it after annexing it as a bridgehead to invade China, the Korean Peninsula would pose a threat if it fell under U.S. control. The author closes with a sensible conclusion: "At the present time, China shares a common interest with the United States, Japan, and Russia in making sure that the Korean Peninsula does not succumb to another wave of fratricidal struggles or big-power confrontations."
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One of the great "ifs" and harsh ironies of history hangs on the fact that in January 1945, four and a half years before they achieved national power in China, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, in an effort to establish a working relationship with the United States, offered to come to Washington to talk in person with President Roosevelt. What became of the offer has been a mystery until, with the declassification of new material, we now know for the first time that the United States made no response to the overture. Twenty-seven years, two wars and x million lives later, after immeasurable harm wrought by the mutual suspicion and phobia of two great powers not on speaking terms, an American president, reversing the unmade journey of 1945, has traveled to Peking to treat with the same two Chinese leaders. Might the interim have been otherwise?
The great hurrahs of the Cultural Revolution, the slogans, the messianic fervor, the public humiliation of the heretics are all gone. A visitor to Peking is impressed by nothing so much as by the return to normalcy, by pragmatism and-if one could imagine it in a Spartan land-a feeling of relaxation. Indeed, one might easily think that there had never been the awesome upheaval of 1966-69 "to change men's souls." Human frailty is once again understood, and there is at least an implied recognition that man does not live by faith alone.
Americans often think China's leadership is split between hard-liners and moderates. It is not. The sooner Washington understands that Beijing is unified, the better.

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