U.N. Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s
This follow-up to the author's earlier edition, The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping, presents case studies of major recent U.N. peacekeeping operations in Angola, Cambodia, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. The collection details the by now familiar dilemmas of peacekeeping: many conflicts like Bosnia require peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping, but the contributing states are seldom willing to commit sufficient resources or to take sides in highly politicized situations, leaving U.N. forces on the ground as powerless hostages. This volume does not add anything surprising to the knowledge of peacekeeping, but the individual chapters are more comprehensive than many of the books on this topic in recent years.
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If conflict in Rhodesia or Viet Nam-or half a dozen other places-should develop in a way that makes a United Nations peacekeeping force desirable and even urgent, what would happen? Could such a force be organized? Would the Soviet Union and France try to block action if the force were created by the General Assembly? Where would the troops come from? Would they be authorized to use their weapons? Who would pay for the undertaking?
The intervention in Somalia was not an abject failure; an estimated 100,000 lives were saved. But its mismanagement should be an object lesson for peacekeepers in Bosnia and on other such missions. No large intervention, military or humanitarian, can remain neutral or assuredly brief in a strife-torn failed state. Nation-building, the rebuilding of a state's basic civil institutions, is required in fashioning a self-sustaining body politic out of anarchy. In the future, the United States, the United Nations, and other intervenors should be able to declare a state "bankrupt" and go in to restore civic order and foster reconciliation.
Michael J. Glennon got it wrong: don't count the UN Security Council out yet.

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