Military Innovation in the Interwar Period
The editors have produced similar works before, and as in the past, they are doing so in response not merely to historical curiosity, but to a contemporary imperative -- hence their introductory thanks to Andrew Marshall of the Defense Department. There are few questions as pressing for defense leaders as how military organizations innovate, and the interwar period is of particular interest as a period of limited financial resources and yet rapid technological evolution. As in any edited work, the essays are of mixed quality. But Alan Beyerchen's essay on German, British, and American work on radar is alone worth the price of the book and is a splendid demonstration of how a cultural and scientific historian can make a major contribution to military history. The description of how culture, organization, and strategic predicament shape a military's reception of a new technology is simply brilliant.
Related
The tools and techniques for waging war never stand still, but these are the early days of a revolution in military affairs as momentous as those wrought by the railroad and the airplane. This newest transformation is a consequence of developments in civilian society including the information revolution and postindustrial capitalism. Its satellite imagery and smart bombs will change the forms of combat and armies. Personnel and politics, as always, will be as crucial as technology.
The United States may be an uncontested military superpower, but it remains defenseless against a new mode of attack: information warfare. As the military, the private sector, and Washington grow increasingly dependent on computers and information networks, they also grow more vulnerable to cyber-attack. Cyberspace is becoming the new front line of warfare, and private citizens are the new prime target. U.S. policymakers and technology entrepreneurs must wake up to this threat and build a wall of defense -- now.
The Cold War induced caution in nations that feared uncontrollable escalation. Now that confrontations are less likely to careen out of control, a new season of bellicosity is here. The U.S. military, trapped in a Cold War mindset, has failed to realize this. It is spending far too much on casualty-prone units in all the services, in an age when political opposition to casualties effectively makes these units unavailable for combat. The military should recalibrate its priorities and shift funds to weapons such as high-tech lasers, stealth aircraft, and cruise missiles that can make warfare less lethal for Americans.

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