Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy
An incisive account, by a historian at Yale, of U.S. and allied economic diplomacy over the past half-century, featuring expert synopses and evaluations of the attitudes, policies, and negotiating stances of Western governments. The question that runs throughout the narrative is whether "we can have it all," and the author's conclusion is that by and large we did. She gives lavish credit to military spending for sparking the postwar growth in the American economy and faults Eisenhower (most unpersuasively) for misunderstanding in his Farewell Address that "it was precisely the American defense spending he condemned that brought unheard of prosperity to the United States." In warning of the "military-industrial complex," Eisenhower was affirming republican values that transcended the question of economic growth, but even on the smaller economic question Ike was right: the diversion of American capital and expertise into weapons production made an important contribution to the later loss of competitiveness and "crumbling infrastructure" Kunz deplores. And authors really ought to stop quoting Lord Palmerston's dictum that "we have no eternal allies," only our eternally selfish interests. The economic diplomacy Kunz recounts would have been far less successful had Western statesmen not affirmed the permanence of the community within which differences of interest and perspective unfolded -- had, in short, they talked like Palmerston instead of Churchill.
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The United States is spreading its aid and efforts too thin in the developing world. It should focus on a small number of "pivotal states": countries whose fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding region and ultimately the stability of the international system. The list should include Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. A discriminating strategy for shoring up the developing world is a wise way to address traditional security threats and new transnational issues; it might be thought of as the new, improved domino theory. If effective, it could forestall the move in Congress to wipe out nearly all foreign aid.
Only a few years ago pundits were sure that the United States was losing to Asia and Europe and had to emulate their more state- directed economies to remain competitive. Now the conventional wisdom is that America is number one and that the rest of the world should adopt its more laissez-faire approach. In fact, neither caricature is right. Asia was booming and now it is slumping, but it will be back. Europe's underlying ossification will persist. But most important, while the U.S. economy is in a period of robust growth, nothing fundamental has changed. Its long-run growth rate has not accelerated, productivity has not risen, and the structural unemployment rate has fallen by one percentage point at most. Come the next recession, all this triumphalism will seem silly.
The growing economic disputes between the USA and Japan could develop into a serious political conflict. The 'Japan problem' is rooted in two fictions (1) that the Japanese state has central organs of government which bear ultimate responsibility for economic and political decision-making, whereas the Japanese system is a collection of different hierarchies without a centre (2) that Japan has a free-market capitalist economy, whereas it is actually a 'capitalist development state', characterized by a partnership between central bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. Fixed trade commitments could be part of the solution.
