The Coming Conflict with China
Among those specialists who follow U.S.-China relations, there is a range of views. Some are optimistic; others see at least a 50 percent chance of developing a more cooperative relationship with China. The authors of this book are extreme pessimists. Their thesis is that the United States and China are on a collision course. China's goal is to dominate Asia, and America's goal for more than a century has been to prevent any single power from dominating Asia. China is "virulently anti-American" and has a "grand plan for the future." Thus "an enemy looms on the Eastern horizon and America had better be prepared."
To be sure, this pessimistic version of U.S.-China relations is one possible future scenario. But it overlooks the common interests that both the United States and China have in maintaining regional peace in Asia, in increasing trade and investment relations, and in preventing a new Cold War that would be extremely costly and risky for both countries. Moreover, although the U.S.-China relationship was in free fall for a number of years after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, it has improved considerably in the past year as a result of efforts on both sides. In the next year, there will be a number of high-level visits, and there is at least some chance that the two big powers can reach some strategic understanding on the main issues that divide them: Taiwan, the U.S.-Japan alliance, proliferation, and human rights.
This book is reminiscent of a number of those dealing with Japan-U.S. relations that appeared in the 1980s. The argument then was that Japan and the United States were on a collision course because of Japan's intention to dominate Asia economically. Ten years later, it seems clear that those books were highly oversimplified. It is unfortunate. A more nuanced warning about the risks in U.S.-China relations and the ways to avoid a worst-case outcome would surely be welcome. So would a book with a less sensational title. But, of course, it might not sell as well.
Related
The simmering dispute over the status of Taiwan may soon explode in violence. The Chinese regime sees Taiwan's recent democratization as an implicit challenge to its own authority and legitimacy and thus continues to threaten and intimidate the island. Meanwhile, Taiwan has procured advanced defensive weapons from the United States. Growing tensions across the Taiwan Strait, along with the lack of military and diplomatic communication, make conflict -- possibly involving the United States -- increasingly likely. To avoid such an outcome, Washington should actively facilitate cross-strait dialogue and deter provocations by either side. But it must do so soon, for both China and Taiwan are growing impatient.
No, it is not a silly question -- merely one that is not asked often enough. Odd as it may seem, the country that is home to a fifth of humankind is consistently overrated as an economy, a world power, and a source of ideas. Economically, China is a relatively unimportant small market; militarily, it is less a global rival like the Soviet Union than a regional menace like Iraq; and politically, its influence is puny. The Middle Kingdom is a middle power. China matters far less than it and most of the West think, and it is high time the West began treating it as such.
Since independence, India's nuclear policy has been to seek either global disarm ament or equal security for all. The old nonproliferation regime was discriminatory, ratifying the possession of nuclear weapons for the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council while preaching to the nuclear have-nots about the virtues of disarmament. India was left sandwiched between two nuclear weapons powers, Pakistan and a rising China. The end of the Cold War has not ushered in an era where globalization and trade trump old-fashioned security woes. If nuclear deterrence works in the West, why won't it work in India?

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