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Persian Gulf Myths
Graham E. Fuller is a senior political analyst at Rand and a former Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA. Ian O. Lesser, a former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, is also a senior political analyst at Rand.See more by Graham E. FullerSee more by Ian O. Lesser
A POLICY FOR LIVING WITH CHANGE
Policy toward the Persian Gulf, one of the more successful facets of U.S. foreign policy over the last decade, is headed for rougher times in the next. "Dual containment," the strategic heart of U.S. policies toward Iran and Iraq, is unraveling. Alliance support in Western Europe is slipping, internal differences in the Gulf Cooperation Council are growing, the potential for instability in Saudi Arabia has become dramatically evident, and a faltering Middle East peace process puts new pressure on Gulf regimes. America's Gulf policy contains time-honored myths, holdovers from the Cold War, and many formulations that have become cloudy or rigid with use. Those basic principles require reexamination. Moreover, the continuing risk of terrorism against the large U.S. military presence in the region highlights the looming challenges to regional strategy.
MAINTAINING ACCESS TO OIL AT MODERATE PRICES
Gulf policy is founded on the principle that access to the region's oil is critical to Western -- indeed, global -- prosperity. The Gulf's many small oil-producing states are largely incapable of defending themselves against larger players in the region. Since the collapse of the Soviet empire, however, serious military threats to oil access in the Gulf have diminished drastically. Even the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 with its assaults on oil platforms, pipelines, terminals, and tankers did not seriously affect the oil market or Western economies. No military power today has the capability to deny the West access to oil, although perceptions of Western vulnerability remain widespread. No anti-American dictator in the Middle East -- not Saddam Hussein, the Ayatollah Khomeini, or Muammar al-Qaddafi -- has attempted to hinder oil sales to the West. What actual task, then, does "maintaining" the flow of oil entail?