Marshall Plan Commemorative Section: Lessons of the Plan: Looking Forward to the Next Century
A look back at perhaps the most important foreign policy success of the postwar period. Edited by Peter Grose, with contributions by historians Diane B. Kunz and David Reynolds, a memoir by Charles P. Kindleberger, a profile of Marshall and Acheson by James Chace and one of Will Clayton by Gregory Fossedal and Bill Mikhail. And reflections from Roy Jenkins, Walt Rostow, and Helmut Schmidt.
Walt W. Rostow, the Rex G. Baker, Jr., Professor of Political Economy at the University of Texas at Austin, was Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and National Security Adviser to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
Three dimensions of the Marshall Plan increase in significance with the passage of time. The first is the plan's role in producing a postwar global economy that would avoid the problems that plagued the West between the two world wars, including those that led to the Great Depression. The best economists of the United States and Europe felt that severe unemployment was the major danger in the wake of the war. Moreover, many feared that countries might again embrace protectionism as the world spiraled into the grasp of economic nationalism. To build a trade and monetary system that would bring their hopes to life, American planners tied their aid to the liquidation of the wartime debt that Western European countries had incurred with their colonies and other developing nations.
Second, the Marshall Plan helped shape the military and political events of the late 1940s and early 1950s and was in turn shaped by them. These included the communist pressure on Greece and Turkey, which led to the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 and Marshall's more constructive proposal in June of that year; the decolonization crises experienced notably by France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, which strained those countries' economies; the Soviet blockade of West Berlin and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which flowed directly from the extension of West German currency reform to West Berlin; and the Korean War, which led the United States to commit four divisions to NATO, raised the question of West German disarmament, and converted the Marshall Plan into a military support program.
The final aspect is the Marshall Plan's role in promoting the move toward European unity. Europeans took the lead in this effort, but they received critical support from both major parties in the United States, despite integration's implicit anti-American rationale. This anti-American undertone may surprise some today, but it was at the time understood with some subtlety on both sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, Americans undertook the Marshall Plan as a national effort. It involved the executive branch and Congress, Democrats and Republicans, the private sector and trade unions, farmers, and a significant portion of the electorate. Only the major war that had preceded it had more fully mobilized American society.
Log in to continue reading
Access to this article requires a one-time free registration. To register, click here.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
America now faces the prospect of economic conflicts with both Europe and East Asia. The United States and the European Union have already fired the first shots of retaliatory sanctions over their ever-growing trade disputes. On the other side of the world, meanwhile, Asian countries are creating a bloc of their own that could include preferential trade arrangements and an Asian Monetary Fund. These developments could produce a tripolar world and hamper global economic integration. To avert this outcome, the United States must quell its domestic backlash against globalization and reassert its economic leadership in the world. The new Bush administration should make multilateral trade liberalization a top priority -- or it will face unpleasant economic and political consequences as the U.S. and foreign economies slow.
America's economy is in its eighth year of sustained growth, transcending the German and Japanese "miracles." This is no fluke. America's unique brand of entrepreneurial capitalism is based on a series of advantages that explain the stunning success of the 1990s and provide the basis for extending this winning streak. These strengths include deft managers, technological innovation, and a culture that values rugged individualism -- all fueled by finance capital that can nimbly meet the needs of a globalized, rapidly changing economy. Furthermore, the era of the deficit is over. Pessimists who warn of inflation should be ignored; American business leaders understand that today's low level of inflation is self-perpetuating. America's prosperity is structural, not transient, and its lead over Europe and Asia will only widen with time. America had the twentieth century. It will also have the twenty-first.
Not for the first time, agricultural trade has become a live and contentious issue in Atlantic relations. Questions of access and protection have been subjects of constant concern to American farmers and traders since the establishment of Europe's Common Agricultural Policy 25 years ago. Now, though, under the pressures of surplus stocks of grain and falling farm incomes, there is a new area of contention--competitive subsidies designed to win or ensure shares in an erratic world market. Months of negotiation have failed to resolve the issue and neither the European Community nor the United States has shown any sign of being ready to sacrifice what both define as legitimate economic interests.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.