NAFTA at Three: A Progress Report
Fortunately, if fortuitously, U.S. employment increased by five percent and U.S. output by eight percent during the first three years of NAFTA; some would almost certainly have blamed any decline in these figures on the accord, even though the Mexican economy is tiny compared to the U.S. economy. Indeed, U.S. exports to Mexico did decline during Mexico's economic depression of 1995. In this short book, Weintraub offers a fair-minded evaluation of NAFTA so far, attempting to sort out those events that can plausibly be attributed to NAFTA and those that occurred independently but had a bearing on Mexico's economic performance. He argues persuasively that NAFTA was not to blame for Mexico's financial crisis of 1994-95, nor the subsequent depression in output, employment, and imports from the United States. Indeed, despite the fall in U.S. exports in 1995, they remained above what they were in 1993, and Mexico did not impose import restrictions, as it had typically done during previous financial crises.
Related
The Salinas regime has ardently pursued the North American Free Trade Agreement as a silver bullet to kill myriad political and economic problems. But NAFTA as it stands would exacerbate many of Mexico's enduring disparities and injustices. Short term adjustment costs and the possibility of backsliding on political reform have largely been overlooked. NAFTA must be designed to contribute to political reform. Otherwise, postponing the accord would not weaken Mexico-only Salinas.
Exaggerated claims and charges are obscuring the facts about the North American Free Trade Agreement. Over time, in almost every instance, what's good for Mexico would also be good for the United States.
To the United States, the labor and environmental costs of NAFTA would be minimal and the economic benefits real, but small. The trade agreement is really about helping a friendly and important neighbor in its yet uncompleted economic and political reform.
