Bargaining With Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do
Successive American administrations have felt both the need for and the frustration of pressing Japan into more open, liberal commercial policies. Political scientist Schoppa examines both the Structural Impediments Initiative of the Bush administration and the "framework" talks of the Clinton administration, each of which met with mixed success, with a view to sorting out the circumstances under which foreign pressure has succeeded or failed to alter Japanese trade policy or practices.
These negotiations went far beyond normal trade agendas to include domestic tax and land-use policy, retail trade and other regulatory law, as well as more traditional barriers to imports. Schoppa finds, unsurprisingly, that success is more likely when American proposals have domestic Japanese support, which is often not difficult to muster in a system as closed to innovation and new companies as the Japanese economy. When domestic allies are absent, they can sometimes be acquired with a plausible trade threat, but threats are likely to be less effective as the Japanese political system becomes more pluralistic and the new World Trade Organization provides a more legitimate, multilateral channel for redress.
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For over half a century Japan and Germany have been at the heart of America's international preoccupations. After a long and destructive war against both countries, the United States worked exhaustively to help its two erstwhile enemies recover and build democratic societies secure under the American defense umbrella. From the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, victor and vanquished moved to a more balanced relationship, especially in trade and finance. Today, in one of history's great role reversals, Tokyo and Bonn have become Washington's fierce trading rivals and also its primary bankers.
As economic crisis plunges Asia into chaos, old wounds may reopen. The continent still fears Japan, thanks to its World War II brutalities. By refusing to apologize, Tokyo only makes matters worse. A power vacuum results: an unrepentant Japan will never be allowed to lead a suspicious Asia. Instead, flash points may ignite, and East Asia and even America could be dragged into a war. To defuse tensions, America must push its ally to show remorse and Japan must pay its World War II debts. In turn, China and Korea -- age-old enemies of Japan -- must learn to look forward, not back.
In less than five years Japan will have a population profile like Florida's. Indeed, Japan's population is aging faster than that of any other country. A future with only two workers for each retiree will force radical change. It will shrink savings, turn the trade surplus to deficit, and drive more industry overseas. These demographic and economic factors will push Japan toward an increasingly independent foreign policy, causing friction with America. Tokyo and Washington must seek new arrangements cognizant of a maturing Japan.
