Bargaining With Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do
Successive American administrations have felt both the need for and the frustration of pressing Japan into more open, liberal commercial policies. Political scientist Schoppa examines both the Structural Impediments Initiative of the Bush administration and the "framework" talks of the Clinton administration, each of which met with mixed success, with a view to sorting out the circumstances under which foreign pressure has succeeded or failed to alter Japanese trade policy or practices.
These negotiations went far beyond normal trade agendas to include domestic tax and land-use policy, retail trade and other regulatory law, as well as more traditional barriers to imports. Schoppa finds, unsurprisingly, that success is more likely when American proposals have domestic Japanese support, which is often not difficult to muster in a system as closed to innovation and new companies as the Japanese economy. When domestic allies are absent, they can sometimes be acquired with a plausible trade threat, but threats are likely to be less effective as the Japanese political system becomes more pluralistic and the new World Trade Organization provides a more legitimate, multilateral channel for redress.
Related
East Asia was a stable region in 1984, marked by general progress toward the goals laid down by the various national leaderships. In Japan, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's election to a second two-year term signified continuity in foreign policy and particularly in the partnership between Washington and Tokyo. Not only is the close security relationship with the United States being maintained; Japan also began significant movement toward a modest but increasing political role in global affairs.
The major events of 1983 in East Asian politics and economics can be looked at from three broad vantage points or planes of abstraction. At the most general level one sees, rather like the movements of tectonic plates on the earth's surface, a slight shift in the center of gravity of U.S. foreign policy from Europe toward Asia. In large part this shift is prompted by a growing realization among the leaders of the United States and Japan that their nations will, for the indefinite future, be paramount in the fundamental sciences and their practical offshoots in microelectronics, biotechnology, fine ceramics, and other new areas of technical development, and that Western Europe will trail in most of these fields and the Soviet Union simply be left behind. The fact that the American President met with the prime minister of Japan three times during 1983 underscores this trend, as did the President's statement in Tokyo in November that "No relationship between any two countries is more important to world peace and prosperity than the relationship between the United States and Japan."
Japan faces its biggest foreign policy challenges since World War II. Its leaders must snap out of their deep funk to confront a rising China, a nuclear South Asia, a United States increasingly prone to Japan-bashing, and a world in economic free fall. Instead of sulking over the growing closeness of U.S.-China ties, Tokyo should take the initiative and propose trilateral dialogues with Beijing and Washington on a range of issues, especially Asian security, nuclear disarmament, and macroeconomic policy. Japan's pessimism threatens the world's prosperity. If Tokyo stays on the sidelines, the world will pass it by.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.