The World and Yugoslavia's Wars
"Toothless," "supine," "craven," and "spineless" are among the favored adjectives in this analysis of the world's response to the wars of Yugoslavia, a collection of eight essays that arose out of a Council on Foreign Relations study group. A measured introduction by Ullman and a lucid philosophical assessment of sovereignty and self-determination by Jean Manas give way to fire-breathing denunciations of Western diplomacy by most of the other contributors. The essays are of high quality but leave this reviewer dissatisfied. The threat and use of force were certainly necessary elements in the West's diplomacy, but employing force on behalf of achievable political aims was also crucial. The authors generally treat the idea of partition with the same derision they bestow on the fecklessness of the U.N. Protection Force. A more persuasive view is that partition ought to have formed a central part of diplomacy from the outset. Instead, unrealistic political objectives (the achievement of an independent, multicultural Bosnia) were paired, incongruously, with an apolitical humanitarianism that made hostages of peacekeepers.
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The crisis over Cuba and the Chinese invasion of India have had their salutary lessons for many nations and many political leaders-for none perhaps more than the neutralists. They have spoken up positively, as before, for peace and negotiation, against blocs and power politics. But what they have seen has attested to their relative inability to influence the course of events, or even to maintain solidarity in their own ranks, when the big powers are taking crucial decisions and the global strategic balance is at stake. A more pertinent question is whether, and how, the neutrals can safeguard their own vital interests.
Slobodan Milosevic catapulted from the ranks of communist functionaries to become the most popular Serbian leader of the century by embracing and promoting nationalism through dramatic mass demonstrations and simplistic propaganda. Adept in the use of patronage and organization-building, he supplanted his mentor as president of Serbia, won the allegiance of the Yugoslav army and manipulated intellectuals and the masses with a "politics of fear." Faced with slipping popularity because of economic sanctions and afraid of Western military intervention, Milosevic is now ready for compromises, but the forces he created may be uncontrollable.
The NATO war in Kosovo did not come out of the blue. The alliance fought only after Belgrade turned a deaf ear to diplomacy, and NATO knew the risks it was running. But doing nothing would have been worse; assenting to Slobodan Milosevic's mass killings would have dangerously undermined the credibility of Western institutions.

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